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A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS OF IBN RUSD AND ISLAMIC THEOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES

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DARUL HUDA ISLAMIC UNIVERSITY

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ABDUL HAFEES PK

PG Dissertation submitted to Darul Huda Islamic University In fulfillment of requirements for the award of the degree of Moulavi Fadhil Al-Hudawi

Darul Huda Islamic University

JANUARY

2013

DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this research is the ultimate fruit of my earnest endeavor, my solemn effort. And I also declare that it has not been submitted as a whole previously to any of the degree requirements.

Abdul Hafees pk Signature ……………

Thottasheri, Padikkal Date: ………………..

APPROVAL PAGE

I certify that I have supervised and read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the award of the degree of Moulavi Fadhil Al-Hudawi.

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This dissertation was submitted to the Department of Aqeeda and Philosophy and is accepted as a fulfillment of the requirement for the award of the degree of Moulavi Fadhil Al-Hudawi.

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A comparative analysis of the philosophical concepts of Ibn Rushd and Islamic theological principles

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Signature Date

My beloved parents; my teachers and classmates;

To them all I dedicate this study.

May Allah accept this contribution and make it an impetus to the revivification of Islamic theological principles.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

All the praises are due to Allah, most merciful and most compassionate.

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ABSTRACT

This study attempts to trace the philosophical concepts of the famous peripatetic Andalusian philosopher Ibn Rushd comparing with Islamic theological principles and beliefs in an earnest endeavor to bring the bare truth. This topic was undertaken in a context of the scarcity of the references which undergo the comparative study between the philosophy of Ibn Rushd and the Islamic theology. Here, the study attempts to establish the recurrent righteousness of Islamic doctrines and the paralyzed entity of concepts Ibn Rushd put forward. In this study, ample attempt has been made to explore the entire historical background of the twelfth century he lived in and on the whereabouts of the political significance of his period in a terrain of the Islamic principles. Moreover, it is the bare picture of his life and a shortlist of his versatility of the works in philosophy, theology and Islamic jurisprudence etc. it is the explanation of his philosophical doctrines as it is the focus of research along with its validity related with the Islamic religious doctrines. In select issues which carry out the philosophical significance and the contradictory embodiment between the theologians and him, it has done as soon as possible to include the entire arguments with reference to his works and its reply of theologians in order keeping the religious norms Islam do puts forward. And at last, it has been mentioned the implications of the theologians in their works against his philosophical doctrines and the crude solutions for them citing from the important philosophical works and tracing intellectual response to them. Indeed, it has been included in this study the certain doctrines he did render in case of their contradiction with that of the Islamic ideals of which the great well-grounded scholars traced out. it does deserve the intellectual study on the incoherent doctrines of which he produced along his philosophical works and it may be affluent to one who is keen interested to explore in this manner.

خلاصة البحث

تحاول هذه الدراسة تتبع المفاهيم الفلسفية الشهيرة للفيلسوف المشائي الأندلسي ابن رشد مع الإشارة إلى العقيدة الإسلامية والمعتقدات في مسعى جاد لتقديم الحقيقة العارية.ومجري هذا الموضوع مني في سياق ندرة المراجع التي تخضع للدراسة مقارنة بين فلسفة ابن رشد ومفاهيم ديننا الإسلامي. هنا، وأنا أحاول أن انشأ بتواضع حقيقة المذاهب الإسلامية المعمرة والكيان المشلولة من أفكاره. في الفصل الأول، أرجو أن أكون قد حاولت استكشاف الخلفية التاريخية بأكملها من القرن الثاني عشر كان يعيش فيه وأهمية السياسية في التضاريس من الوطن الإسلامية. وعلاوة على ذلك، فإنه هو الصورة العارية من حياته وقائمة قصيرة من براعة له من الأعمال في الفلسفة واللاهوت والفقه الإسلامي وغيرها. الفصل الثاني هو التفسير المذاهب الفلسفية كما هو مركزي للبحث مع صلاحيته نسبة الي المذاهب الدينية الإسلامية. في قضايا مختارة التي تشتمل أهمية الفلسفية وتجسيد متناقضة بين علماء دين وبينه اي ابن رشد ، وقد فعلت جهدي لتشمل الحجج كاملا مع الإشارة إلى أعماله وردها من علماء دين من حيث ان يحفظ المعايير الدينية التي تتقىم المذاهب الدينية الإسلامية. وأخيرا، في الفصل الثالث لقد ذكرت الآثار المترتبة على اللاهوتيين في أعمالهم ضد المذاهب الفلسفية والحلول الخام بالنسبة لهم مشيرا الي أعمال الفلسفية الهامة متبعا الاستجابة الفكرية لها نسبيا. ولقد تضمنت في هذا الفصل الثالث مذاهبه المعينة في حالة تناقض للمثل الإسلامية التي ترتكز العلماء الكبار تتبع بها. في الواقع، آمل أن تثبت استحقاق هده الدراسة عن المذاهب الفكرية غير متماسكةالتي أنتج أعماله الفلسفية وأنه قد تكون هده الدراسة مثمرة طول افكارمن الذي يحرص لاستكشاف بهذه الطريقة.

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

## 1.1 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

Twelfth century had witnessed the rise of a lodestar, who became an advisor of princes, lawyer, after that a jurist and a famous philosopher of his period whose expertise has been reckoned in philosophy, medicine and Islamic jurisprudence. His doctrines were a big challenge for the Islamic philosophers and theologians of that time though further it sponsored scores of sarcastic writings over them. His legal, jurisprudent and philosophical works embody a point of view in contrast to that of the peripatetic or Islamic philosophers and theologians of all the time. Moreover, his scientific works notably in two areas, astronomy and medicine also had sponsored too many controversies among the intellectuals of the whole world

This paper entitled as ‘a comparative analysis of the philosophical concepts of Ibn Rushd and Islamic theological principles’ is the explanation of the inconsistency in the whole philosophical concepts of Ibn Rushd as it is regarded to the indisputable consistence of Islamic principles. This study wasn’t made only in a certain context of the encounter of Islamic philosophers and theologians against his philosophical works but also, in the context of the scarcity of the references in this topic. Furthermore, it is a search for the right and wrong in his doctrines. There hasn’t enough academic and journalistic attention before towards the entire idea of Islamic philosophy and the counter attack of Ibn Rushd. In this backdrop, the present study aims to pay the attention of the researchers in this manner of the contradictory arguments in the philosophical concepts to that of the Islamic principles.

It is a reach out to the related researches made by some academic scholars on this topic or in its surroundings. In 2012, it was made a study on almost the same topic by Katharine Louise Wright on the title ‘the incoherence of the intellectuals: Ibn Rushd, al Ghazali, al Jabari and Tarabichi in eight centuries of dialogue without dialogue’ to the university of Texas at Austin.

And in the year 2010, a research entitled as ‘between philosophy and the law: Ibn Rushd, Leo Strauss [1], and the demands of the city’ by Jessica l. Radin was submitted to Mcmaster university. It is the critical analogy of the philosophical works and pertaining law of Ibn Rushd and Leo Strauss.

In the year 1986, a well profound thesis entitled as ‘Ibn Rushd’s metaphysics’, the translation of the ‘metaphysics of Aristotle’ was submitted by Charles Genequand in the Leiden university. It carries out the important aims of metaphysics and the large explanation on Ibn Rushd’s doctrines over the spontaneous generation and form. It is not only a description over his concepts in astronomy but also the narrative of the Aristotelian concepts of human and divine intellect of which he inherited. And some other researches on the related topics have been made amply.

In this backdrop, it is the attempt to pen over the philosophical concepts of Ibn Rushd in comparison with the Islamic principles on certain controversial issues carrying out the theological significance which may result the coming theological concepts of some ethnic groups.

## 1.2 METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY

The study scrutinizes the philosophical strands came out of Rushdian mindset that overtake the basic tenets of Islam and the crude solutions to the cropped-up issues in the course of critical analogy between them. It has been conceptualized here a well-defined set up to order the contradictory arguments of Ibn Rushd along with the rectifying response of Islamic theologians like Saa’d dhin Thafthazani [2] and Imam al Ghazali. [3] The core information from wide ranging sources has been put forward with a special focus into the diverse issues in favour of Islamic theologians and vice versa.

The first step was taken to coordinate the controversial portions within his works and it has been presented in a well-defined order as far as possible. it might make everyone thinking of the certain circumstances Ibn Rushd overcame in the course of al moravid and al mohavid regimes in Spain. It can demonstrate the wide ambiguous ridicules all over his works which carry out the ideas to nullify Islamic authenticity and wide acceptance around the globe.

And the further steps were taken to order a brief sketch on every moment he lived. It can carry his thoughts and its evolution in the course of time and the whys and wherefores of his philosophical concepts to overtake the Islamic theological concepts. Through a characteristic study on his ethical, political, epistemological and metaphysical concepts this study defines the significance of Islamic principles through over the time. This study configures the paid attention of his works on the philosophical doctrines which eventually have to lead the loads of religious sects to deviate from the truth and even arrive at blasphemy. Attempts have been taken to ameliorate the study with a further overview over the researches made in various universities in the departments of Islamic philosophy and theology such as Leiden, Texas and Nigeria etc. it specifically examines the research methodology of those studies and imprints the reach outs they made. Moreover, it suggests the impudent and imprudent criticism of western academicians against the Islamic philosophical doctrines. Along with, this paper also finds out the manual of criticism they received against the theological concepts of Islam.

## 1.3 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

This study aims at the brief overview of the place of Islamic philosophy in Andalusia in the twelfth century and to introduce Ibn Rushd and the general aims and concerns of his works and writings in philosophy and Islamic jurisprudence. It highlights some of the most central ideas and arguments presented by Ibn Rushd in defense of the place of Islamic philosophy and its role within a monotheistic Islamic context.

This study does focus mainly into three areas:

1. A peripheral sketch on the irregularities apparent across his philosophical works.

2. A possible explanation over the Islamic theological principles and its constant and consistent stand against the problematic approaches of Rushdian philosophy with the theoretical illustrations.

3. A characteristic study of the philosophical doctrines of Ibn Rushd and the comparative outlook to the Islamic theological principles.

## 1.4 THE ONSET OF PHILOSOPHY IN AL ANDALUS

[4]

While philosophy was in the eclipse in the eastern lands of Islam, it flourished in the west in general and in Islamic Spain in particular. In accordance with the interference of Muslim theologians in the east, philosophy was about to grow up in the western part of the world. The thing to be noted is that the conflicts between Abbasids of Iraq and Umayyads of Spain along with the cultural relation between east and west also went on. According to said Al Andalusi [5], the famous historian of philosophy and medicine Al Andalus had started the study of medicine and ancient sciences early as the reign of Muhammed ibn abd al rahman rather received fresh impetus in the reign of al Mustansir. He ordered to import scientific and philosophical books from the east, so that on that time Cordova began to rival Bagdad, with its university and library. Matters took an adverse step during his reign that he ordered to burn the books on ancient science that his predecessors collected later, especially those on astronomy and logic. ‘However, it exceeded gradually their interest in science and philosophy by the middle of next century and a good deal of scholars like Abdulrahman known as Euclidean, one who wrote on geometry and logic, and Abu Uthman Ibn Fathun who concentrated on music and grammar were distinguished in their own fields’. [6]

Maslamah ibn majriti [7] was another one who travelled from east to west and also credited as the author of ghayathe hakim (the aim of the sage). And Ibn Masarrah [8] who was also like Majriti travelled from east to west and his ideas are said to have influenced the great Sufi Ibn Arabi. According to the authentic sources, ‘Islamic philosophy in the western lands of Islam actually began with the Sufi philosopher Ibn Masarrah, who profoundly influenced later thinkers in the west.’ [9] And other prominent scholars to be mentioned such as Abdul Hakam al Kirmani, who became expert in geometry and is, said to have authored some philosophical works too. Abdullah Ibn Nabbash and Uthman of Toledo were also counted by the historians as the Andalusian scholars of that time.

Andalusian philosophy witnessed another lodestar in philosophical teachings toward the end of eleventh century who was Abu Bakr Ibn al Sayigah known as in Arabic as Ibn Bajja and in the Latin sources as Avempace, born in Saragossa, moved to Seville and then to Granada and died in fez, morocco in 1138. The philosophical works came out from him includes a paraphrase of Aristotle’s physics, a large number of commentaries on al Farabi, a political treatise entitled as the conduct of the solitary and an epistle on conjunction. Most of his works earned him a profound acumen in philosophical and political fields as well.

The next renowned figure in Andalusian philosophy was Abu Bakr Ibn Thufyl who was born in Wadi ash, not so far from Granada and after educated in Seville and Cordova. He was also the teacher of Ibn Rushd in medicine. Hayy ibn yaqzan (living son of wakeful), a philosophical allegory and a lost treatise on the soul were the major writings. In his Hayy ibn yaqzan he tries to the unity of rational and mystical wisdom by the use of a fictional narrative. [10]

Distinguished from other philosophers from Andalusia and other types of philosophical groups, Ibn Rushd had a position of lawyer, jurist and a renowned philosopher of his age. He was an advocate of Malikite [11] law. He is known in Europe as Averroes and in the perspective of European thought; he is a modern thinker, philosopher explored in western group of ideas, so that he found that a school of thought need not a religion helps make it clear. But according to Islamic thought, he is one who explored between spiritual ideas and philosophical thoughts so that revelation is compatible to our wisdom. ‘He followed the Muslim curriculum, learning hadith with his father, further, became esteemed in that area. He was not only a jurist but also a scholar and philosopher. He preferred the science of law (dirayath) to the science of traditions (rivayath) while he bore the position of a jurist’ [12].

The life of Islamic philosophy did not terminate with Ibn Rushd nearly eight hundred years ago, as thought by western scholarship for several centuries; rather, its activities continued strongly during later centuries, particularly in Persia and other eastern lands of Islam, including India and ottoman turkey, and it was revived in Egypt during the nineteenth century. [13]

CHAPTER 2: IBN RUSHD: HIS LIFE AND WORKS

## 2.1 His life

Abu al Walid Muhammad Ibn Ahmad Ibn Muhammad Ibn Rushd al-Hafid was born right after the death of his named grandfather, who was qadi (judge) and Imam at the Great Mosque at Cordoba and a prominent jurist of the Malikite School then dominant in Almoravid Spain and Morocco, in 1126 in a family which was one of those dynasties with a tradition of learning and service to the state. He was the last great philosopher in Islam in the twelfth century, and is the most scholarly and scrupulous commentator of Aristotle.

Ibn Rushd was inspired for his study in philosophy by his friend Ibn Thufyl, a great thinker and after he translated and elaborated the works contented with Aristotelian thoughts. Totally, he worked as a commentator of Aristotle through the intervention of Ibn Thufyl [14] and perhaps Ibn Harun, his medical teacher who was the doctor of Seville and future caliph. Ibn Thufyl fetched him to the sultan requesting to make accessible the works of Aristotle and to comment on them. So that Ibn Rushd started to write commentaries on the works of Aristotle and after bore a position in court of Marrakesh. ‘He was taught Tradition by Abu’l Qasim, Abu Marwan Ibn Masarrat, Abu Jafar Ibn Aziz and Abu Abdullah Marzi. He learnt fiqh from Hafiz Abu Muh~ammad Ibn Rizq. Abu Jafar, a reputed scholar, taught him medicine. Ibn Rushdsoon acquired great scholarship in literature, law, philosophy and medicine. He was a contemporary of some of the outstanding thinkers of Muslim Spain, including Ibn Zuhr, Ibn Baja and Ibn Tufayl.’ [15]

In 1149, complaints were made largely to the authority of sultan against Ibn Rushd due to the disagreement of his ideas to the religious norms and their traditional customs. As a result, he was briefly exiled, and it was burned his books. They banned him to write on philosophy politics or religion. ‘The major reason to his fall was his defense of rationalism and the frankness of his social criticism’ [16]. Perhaps too many people agreed with him. This period of unpopularity for Ibn Rushd, however, did not last long. The ban against him was cancelled, but as far as history tells us, he wrote no more, though his son began to publish about this time. ‘He was a great lover of his native land. Like Plato who in his Republic has highly praised Greece, Ibn Rushd has claimed his native land, Spain, to be the rival of Greece. According to Ptolemy [17], Greece possessed the best climate in the world, but Ibn Rushd claims the same distinction for Cordova, the capital of Muslim Spain.’ [18]

Along his lifetime, he had to write more than more than 100 books and treatises, and it was in Marrakech that he began his first philosophical work, sometime before 1159. As a start of his long voyage of writing philosophical concepts with no consideration of old traditional beliefs or some other religious traits, this was the publishing of his most famous Compendium of Philosophy (Kitab al-Jawami’ al-Sighar fil-Falsafa) with its separate sections on discussing physics, heaven and earth, generation and corruption, meteorology and metaphysics.

In 1169 he was appointed as qadi of Seville, the former capital of Andalusia, present Spain. He returned to Cordoba ten years later as qadi, and then appointed a second time to Seville in 1169 and he became chief qadi three years later. That Ibn Rushd held the position in not one but two cities indicate the respect in which he was held. But he moved on along with his service in law, studied medicine, and it is for this aspect of his learning and writing that he was most esteemed in the Islamic world.

As historians refer to the fact, the major part of Ibn Rushd’s philosophy is derived from the Greeks, especially from Plato and Aristotle, whom Ibn Rushd had admired and on whose works he wrote ample commentaries and paraphrases, books that to a large amount won him the echelons of respect he enjoyed in the West, where the struggle to reconcile science and faith still goes on.

The impact of this man’s thought grew again and again infinite though his name is hardly famous in the West today, and though his works are now largely unread. In 1171, at age 45, Ibn Rushd returned to Córdoba. There, for the rest of his life, he maintained his major residence and his library. The constant political tensions caused by the Almohad conquest of Al Andalus and the struggles with the Christians to the north seem not to have much affected the relative peace and prosperity of Seville and Córdoba, Ibn Rushd produced ample works on a wide range of subjects, from his paraphrase of the Kitab al-Akhlaq, which has not survived intact, to his analysis of Aristotle’s Poetics from the Talkhis Kitab al-Shi’r, as well as his Supplement to Questions on Ancient Science (Damima li-Mas’alat al-Ilm al-Qadim) and further medical treatises. His work on Ptolemy’s Almagest may also belong to this period. After another visit to Marrakech, he found time to write one of his most famous works, his sidestep of al-Ghazali’s Incoherence of the Philosophers, entitled Incoherence of the Incoherent Philosophy of al-Ghazali (Tahafut al-Tahafut al-Falasifa lil-Ghazali). As a result, Ibn Rushd’s fame was spreading into the eastern Islamic world, and by 1190 his books were available and under analysis in Cairo. However, this work contains almost unclear presentation of the arguments and mere ridiculous response for al Ghazali’s comments. And it also has been reported that his writings in Latin were often attacked by theologians such as Albertus Magnus [19], Bonaventure [20], and Thomas Aquinas [21], while those same teachings and arguments inspired the Latin Averroist movement.

It was on December 11, 1198 Ibn Rushd died at Marrakech. Three months later his body was returned, as he had wished, to rest in the soil of his beloved Córdoba. His rival, the mystic Ibn al- Arabi, explains his funeral: “When the coffin with his body was laid upon the bier, they put his works on the opposite side to serve as a counterweight. I was standing there…and I said to myself, ‘On one side the master and on the other his works. But, tell me, were his desires at last fulfilled?’ it can be considered Ibn Arabi’s words to show his ample writings in different fields rather what he says ‘tell me, were his desires at last fulfilled?’ can be taken only as an opinion of Ibn Arabi on the great philosophy of Ibn Rushd because of his stand against certain religious facts but it was not to diminish his personality.

Al islam wa al nasraniyyah ma’al ilmi wal madaniyyah (Islam and Christianity and their respective attitudes towards learning and civilization), an article published in Al Jamiah by a Christian editor, in which he sums up the matters under discussion. The article also ascribed that the denial of the efficacy of secondary causes and asserted that in reality Ibn Rushd was an unbeliever. In an article in response to the former Muhammed Abduh [22] discusses at length the causes which have brought about the present day the rigidity of Islam as a system, and its deleterious effects upon the conditions of the philosophy of Ibn Rushd and his attitude and that of the Muslim theologians regarding the matter and existence, with reference to the question of that Christian editor. [23] Likewise, there are too many historians who criticized him positively and negatively according to his works which encounter the Islamic principles. The oxford Islamic encyclopedia underlines that ‘After Ibn Rushd, Islamic philosophy began to wane in the west but did not disappear completely.’

### 2.1.1 Historical Background of His Time

When Ibn Rushd was young, Al Andalus was about to witness the great concatenation of crusades and to be divided into small localities and localities which known as the taifa [24] kingdoms. Though a bit weak was, these kingdoms cared for a competitive manner each other to overtake others in greatness and in giving scholastic instructions. As the crusades began, the newly unified Christians from the north had embarked on the reconquest of Spain from the Muslims and it was finally concluded in 1492. [25]

In the twelfth century, Sufism was winning much importance in the Islamic world even as Ibn Rushd’s doctrines had a little influence for its contradictory approach to that of Islamic doctrines. Although, in the west he became very prominent scholar, who find out Aristotle through his ideas and he developed certain philosophical doctrines. Here, it is to be noted that the philosophical career of Ibn Rushd often assumed as the end of Islamic philosophy. During his lifetime, two distinguished philosophers, became extremely influential later in the Islamic world were Yahya Suhrawardi [26] and Muid ad din Ibn Arabi [27]. Ibn Arabi followed the footsteps of Ibn Sina with a huge attempt to fuse philosophy with Sufi spirituality. [28]

‘Through the great philosophers writing in Arabic, notably Ibn Sina and Ibn Rushd, Islamic civilization made a significant contribution to the development of philosophy in the western world and this might lead those unfamiliar with that civilization to suppose that the philosophical movement was a prominent part of the stream of Islamic thought. Despite the separateness of philosophy, the body of thought which they represented had a powerful influence on Islamic thought’. [29]

In the historical backdrop of the political disorder of Ibn Rushd’s years would also lead to the dispersion across Europe of educated men from southern Spain who spread new ideas, new techniques and new books like seeds. Among those scholars of secular institutions, Ibn Rushd was one of the most accepted by the West as a bridge between two faiths and between past and present. ‘In fact, after Islamic philosophy came to an end in the Islamic world with the demise of Ibn Rushd, it found a new life in the Sunni world, especially in Persia, and has continued as a living tradition in that country to the present day’. [30]

### 2.1.2 The Classification of Knowledge of Ibn Rushd

Ibn Rushd has classified the philosophy of science into three:

1. Science of theory- it aims at the knowledge and learning

2. Science of practice- it is to make practical in order to what one has learnt.

3. Science of logic- it is a science of certain laws or specific devises to keep the mind free from the mistakes and lapses.

The science of reason has been counted under these three sciences. But, Science of theory has been divided into kulliyyah and juziyyah. The former one is the investigation on the beings and what is added into its essences. Science of metaphysics is also counted as its branch. And this is the science named according to Ibn Rushd as the philosophy of science.

Ibn Rushd asserts that it implies either the science of the essences of the beings or it is the science of the supernatural matters. Anyway, the kulliyyah kind of theoretical science is the discussion on the existence and the juziyyah kind is sometimes referred to the Science of theory as it is the investigation of Aarad which is the essentialities of the beings.

Here, juziyyah kind has again been divided into two:

1. Natural science: it is to investigate the natural things belong to the motion and change.

2. Mathematical science: it is referred simply to the numbering free from hayula:

The natural science has been divided also into eight, which is described respectively.

1. Natural audition: to investigate the usual causes in the nature along with its motion and change in location and time. Theses causes are four: the active, the objective causes, the conformity and hayoola

2. Sky and the world: to investigate the secrets of heavenly bodies and all that exists here excluding the God.

3. The happening and the decay

4. Heavenly bodies

5. Metals

6. Plants

7. Animals

8. The soul (rooh): especially the source of the faculty of the soul in order to think and do certain actions. [31]

### 2.1.3 The Controversy over Ibn Rushd

Some of the Muslim scholars of that time arrive with a conclusion that the study of logic (mantiq), it is quite improper to a good believer. Simply, what Ibn Rushd did in his works was to combine philosophy with religion, and, in particular, he promoted logic as the key to a true understanding of religion. As for whether the results were attacking the Islamic creed, like all the great philosophers, Ibn Rushd arrived at his share of improper views to attack conventional ideas of Islam.

Here, we consider the three main issues Ibn Rushd made and which was the major element spoiled his future and his acceptance.

1. He asserts that both philosophy and the text of the Qur’an point concludes that the world has always existed in some form or another that although God has created the nature of creatures, the physical world itself has eternally existed, just as God himself has. But Islam asserts that the world is only temporary and it is destructible not just as God, he is eternal and has some other attributes refer to his omniscience and omnipresence.

2. He asserts that although our souls survive death; our bodies do not, and will not be resurrected. And our souls will have a type of body (jasad) in the next life, but he denies that this will be the same body (jasad) that we have now, or even the same kind of body (jasad), and he further denies that we should take literally Qur’an’s various attractive statements about the paradise (jannath) that awaits the believer. But Islam insists the body will be the same to be resurrected as we belong today in accordance with the scriptural evidences.

3. And most strange is that Ibn Rushd denies that we each have our own intellect (aql). Instead, he thinks, the intellect (aql) is something other than our souls, immaterial thing that we are able to access when we think, and that we all share. This assertion also can’t come in term with Islamic creed.

In fact, Ibn Rushd had thought that each could be decisively recognized on philosophical grounds, drawing on the instructions of Aristotle rather each of these views was countered, and broadly regarded as unconventional to the creed of Islam. In one of his best-known works, the Decisive Treatise, (Faslul maqal) Ibn Rushd argues amply for the value of philosophy: not just that it should be permitted, but that its study is, in fact, required for those who would truly understand religion. To ban philosophy would be “a wrong to the best sort of people and to the best sort of existing things.” Here, it could be understood the frailty and impracticality of his words which describe the necessity of philosophy to a believer.

As the onset of the attack against the philosophers, al Ghazali had attacked severely against the peripatetic philosophers along his autobiography al munqidh minal dhalal [32] then he shortlisted their views and objections in maqasid ul falasifa and it led the critics to refer him as a peripatetic. And eventually, he wrote tahafuth al falasifah with a severe attack of heresy against them and accusing them the deviation from the Islam to deny the creation of the world, God’s knowledge of particulars and bodily resurrection. And after that, as in a good deal of his work, Ibn Rushd is opposing Al-Ghazali, who had urged Muslims after he made a reach out to every branches of knowledge to set aside secular learning in a Sufi-influenced program of spiritual refinement. Al-Ghazali’s famous work Revivification of the Religious Sciences argues that believers should set aside not just philosophy and logic, but also the controversial debates of the theologians unless they may go astray while choosing their path of life. Here, it is to be noted that Al-Ghazali had searched for the ultimate truth and eventually he identified that Sufism was the most ultimate subject contained truth and the only shortcut to salvation. Al-Ghazali himself was writing in opposition to al-Farabi and Ibn Sina, who had been at the forefront of incorporating Aristotle’s philosophy into the Islamic worldview. Al-Ghazali’s goal was to tear down that whole construction of learning founded on Greek philosophical thought, and to put in its place the sort of spiritual practices promoted by Sufism. He himself acted on these theories and he avoided his eminent position as professor of theology in Baghdad, and submitted the next decade to a life of ascetic meditation to bear in the minds of the world the isolated sanctity of the Sufi branch of knowledge and its single practicality in a modus Vivendi of a Muslim.

Ibn Rushd was working within an Islamic milieu as the historical background of his life, he would recognize pleasure and sadness with some aspect of the afterlife, but as we have understood, he was unable to accept the traditional view of the afterlife as containing surviving individuals like ourselves. Without religious language and images, ordinary believers may find it complex to grasp that our moral actions affect not only ourselves but the pleasure of the whole community, not just at a particular time or in a particular place but as a species. When we behave badly, we damage our own chances of human being successful, and this affects our personal opportunities for achieving pleasure and growing as people. It also affects our relationships with other people, resulting in the decline of society. The importance of the notion of an afterlife is that it points to the wider terms of reference in which only the moral actions have life.

## 2.2 HIS WORKS

The list totals sixty-seven works of Ibn Rushd, including twenty-eight on philosophy, five on theology, eight on law, four on grammar and twenty on medicine [33].

Among them some Arabic editions and their translations are listed as follows:

Tahafuthu tahafuth

Faslul maqal

Bidayath al- mujthahid wa nnihayathul muqthaswid

Kitab al-Kulliyat fil-Tibb

Kashfu manahijil adilla

Fasl al-maqal: this book was written during 1179-80. G. Hourani has translated it into English with the title, Ibn Rushd on the Harmony of Religion and Philosophy, (Translation and analysis of the Fasl al-maqal and two other short pieces on the same topic.)

Tahafut al-tahafut:(The Incoherence of the Incoherence), this was written during 1180(ed. S. Van den Bergh, Ibn Rushd’ Tahafut al-Tahafut The Incoherence of the Incoherence), the standard translation of Ibn Rushd’s response to Al-Ghazali, incorporating the latter’s text.

A number of his invaluable works were spoiled when the Christian conquerors set fire to the intellectual treasures of the Moors (Spanish Muslims) amassed after centuries of intellectual activity. More than eighty thousand rare manuscripts were reduced to ashes in Grenada alone. Muslim thinkers like Ibn Sina and Ibn Rushd formulated their ideas with logical precision and in the latter Arabic philosophy reached its apogee. It is all the more creditable for the learned Averroes that he compiled his varied and invaluable works in such a distracted state of mind and disturbed conditions. [34] He was an astronomer of repute who wrote "Kitab fi Harkati’l Falaq", a treatise dealing with the motion of the sphere. But, Some of Ibn Rushd’s works do now only exist in Hebrew or Latin, and some don’t at all. But what was found from his Latin editions such as his commentaries are listed as follows:

Commentaries on Aristotle, was written between the years 1169-98. Aristotelis opera... cum Averrois Cordubensis vards in eosdem commentariis.

Middle Commentaries on Aristotle, was written in 1174, ed. C. Butterworth, Ibn Rushd’ Middle Commentaries on Aristotle’s Categories and De Interpretatione.

Short Commentaries on Aristotle, was written before 1175, ed. C. Butterworth, Ibn Rushd’ Three Short Commentaries on Aristotle’s ‘Topics’, ‘Rhetoric’ and ‘Poetics’,

Long Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, was in the year 1190, ed. C. Genequand, Ibn Rushd’s Metaphysics.

Middle Commentary on Plato’s Republic, was published in 1194, ed. R. Lerner, Ibn Rushd on Plato’s ‘Republic’.

### 2.2.1 Tahafuthu Tahafuth (The Incoherence of Incoherence)

Although Ibn Rushd did discuss theological topics in his commentaries occasionally, he usually used to discuss them for his more polemical works. His Tahafuthu tahafuth (The Incoherence of Incoherence), was a response to an earlier attack upon philosophy, Tahafut al falasifa (Incoherence of the Philosophers), written by al-Ghazali argues in this work that there are two major problems with Islamic philosophy. The first problem he argues is that the very philosophical techniques which it advocates contradict with their arguments which philosophy itself advocates. The other problem is that the conclusions of philosophy contradict the principles of Islam, which the philosophers pretend they are supporting. Al-Ghazali produced accurate descriptions of philosophical arguments and then set about demolishing them one by one, using the same philosophical principles which his opponents try to employ with a sharp shooting for every single discussion.

Tahafuthu tahafuth (The Incoherence of Incoherence) is the major work of Ibn Rushd consists of about twenty analyses [35] with well arranged replies of his rebuttal of certain facts Imam al Ghazali made in his famous work tahafuthul falasifah (The incoherence of philosophers) which could be entitled also the incoherence of Mutakallimun,

Al Ghazali claims that the philosophers, their judgments are based not on verified and certain knowledge, but on speculation and probability, he argues also the credibility of philosophers has to be defined as per their visions and philosophical ideas. He finds out three areas wherein kalam and philosophy may come into conflict are semantics, physics and metaphysics. He regards as an unredeemable contradiction the conflict between usul ul din and the rational study of divinity (ilahiyath). [36]

### 2.2.2 (Kashful Manahijl Adillah) An exposition of the methods of argument concerning the doctrines of religion

His main principle is that philosophy must agree with religion; this in fact was the belief and hope cherished by all the Muslim philosophers. Like Francies Bacon, Ibn Rushd believed that though a little philosophy might incline a man towards atheism a deeper study of it would enable him to have a better understanding of religion.

He describes the state of the soul in this work ‘The basic assumption of all the permissible views is the immortality of the soul. It can be proved from the Qur’an, which equates death with sleep; now since we know that the soul is not dissolved in sleep, the same applies to death. In both cases the organ, not the soul itself, ceases’ [37] on the contrary of Asharites’ explanations that it is therefore not eternal and it becomes anew in the case of afterlife not the same what we have today.

### 2.2.3 Faslul Maqal (Decisive Treatise)

The decisive treatise authored by him is to examine the relationship between divine law and human intelligence on the one hand, and the objective of the law on the other hand, the author sets out to epistemology, psychology, religious and which has been established. Since God's purpose with the Quran is to reveal the truth to all his creatures and instruct them in the proper way of life, there are three different ways to access to the approval of the religious law, which is in accordance with the significant difference in intellectual skill among men through rhetorical, dialectical and clear arguments.

It was aimed the solution of the problems of the relation between sharia’ and hikmah’. It is a compendium which applies philosophical and theological methods to the interpretation of the texts of scripture (shar’). He defines philosophy as the investigation of existing entities in so far as they point to the maker in so far as they are made since existing entities exhibit the maker [38].

It states that holy Quran itself recommends rational study, as it ‘urges people of understanding to reflect’ [39] and asks ‘have they not considered the kingdom of the heavens and the earth and all things God has created’ [40]

“Ordinary religion is enough for the masses, but the philosophy is necessary to satiate the educated persons. There are two languages, symbolic for the masses and demonstrative for the philosopher, which don’t oppose each other” [41]. Ibn Rushddoes not hesitate to defend the philosophy against the accusation of Impiety through a legal form of argument as the methodological relation between fasl and bidayah becomes obvious.

### 2.2.4 Bidayath Al- Mujthahid Wa Nnihayathul Muqthaswid

He was an eminent legist of his time and worked as a Qadi for a considerable period. His "Bidayatu’l Mujtahid wa Nihayatu’l Muqtasid" is, according to Abu Jafar Dhahabi, the best book ever written on this subject. Bidayath al- mujthahid wa nnihayathul muqthaswid (Beginning for whoever makes a personal effort and an end whoever is satisfied) dates from around 1168, a monument of logical explication of Muslim law. It is a treatise of ikhthilaf (The science of comparing different schools of legal interpretation) considering not only the major schools of interpretation, but also each solution proposed by small schools or certain individuals. According to Ibn Rushd ikhthilaf is a method in its self, a matter of bringing to light the principles which produce differences.

What bidaya aims is to show that all jurists would have to see if they had not been blinded by allegiance to a particular school. This is exactly extended through the application of an Aristotelian formula. The contents of bidaya ought to be sufficient to give capacity to true jurists conspicuous through their capacity to apply them to each situation. Ibn Rushd points out that whether there is a point of inconsistence it must be due to differences of interpretation of the sources. He persuaded that the law itself cannot be deficient. The ikhthilaf is a commentary on the law which is supposed to deal with each point in an ideal order.

### 2.2.5 Kitab Al-Kulliyat Fil-Tibb (Compendium of Medical Knowledge)

The other major work which he produced during these years at Marrakech was became a standard text for generations of physicians in both East and West, the first sketch of his Compendium of Medical Knowledge (Kitab al-Kulliyat fil-Tibb). It was written by the request of the sultan; it is divided into seven books: anatomy, health, disease, symptoms, food and medicines, preservation of health and treatment of illness. It is to the Kulliyat and other medical works that Ibn Rushd owes his fame in the East today, where he is remembered as a great doctor. Indeed, versions of it were still appearing on medical school reading lists around Europe as recently as 100 years ago. It is to be mentioned that The Kulliyat was a great success for Ibn Rushd.

### 2.2.6 The Talkhis (Middle Commentary) on De Anima

This Talkhis occupies an intermediate position between Al-Mukhtasar and Al-Sharh, exhibiting similarities and differences, regarding these texts, in both form and content. With respect to form, Al-Talkhis is a commentary on Aristotle's De Anima, being in fact Ibn Rushd's first commentary on this work and its structure differs from that of Al-Mukhtasar, while bearing some similarities to that of Al-Sharh. With respect to content, particularly in its conceptualization of the problem of the intellect, Al-Talkhis is closer to Al-Mukhtasar and differs from Al-sharh.

Al-Talkhis does indeed differ from Al-Mukhtasar in two significant ways: in the varying number of extant manuscripts and by the fact that Al-Talkhis still only exists in manuscript form. Nevertheless, the difficulties involved in reconstructing the two texts are similar in principle, although they are less evident in Al-Talkhis. It should be pointed out at the outset that, whereas our analysis and conclusions concerning Al-Mukhtasar were based on significant variants among the manuscript copies, the two important manuscripts of Al-Talkhis agree more closely with each other. Yet it can be concluded that the Talkhis manuscripts represent two different versions, with one manuscript, particularly in respect of those chapters relevant to this study, representing an earlier version, and the other containing additions and amendments made to the text at a later date. [42]

### 2.2.7 Al-Mukhtasar

It is of the two versions and the major distinctive differences between the two versions can best be summed up by saying that the first constitutes a coherent and well-organized text, while the second contains additions to the first which create uncertainties over the actual meaning. The differences between the two versions may be treated with respect to two factors.

The particular features of the first version are as follows:

(1) The analogy of the tablet is used to define the capacity of the imaginative faculty (al-quwwa 'I-khayaliyya) to accept intelligibles, which are represented by the writing on the tablet, while the subjective self (al-nafs al-mawdk`a) of this capacity is represented by the tablet itself. It is clear that parts of this analogy reflect certain perspectives on the material intellect, imaginary representations and the theoretical intellect different from those set out in Al-Talkhis, and significantly different from the conclusions reached in Al-Sharh al-kabir. Interestingly, these perspectives are similar to those held by Ibn Bajja. The absence or omission of this analogy from the other manuscript copies is the first indication of Ibn Rushd's changing position on the structure of the material intellect.

(2) The long chapter discussing the rational faculty is divided into two parts: in the first part Ibn Rushd summarizes a portion of ibn Bajja's Risalat al-ittisal, while in the second he sets out what appears to be a summary of Ibn Bajja's method-in such a way as to suggest support for it. The conspicuous absence or omission of these passages from later versions can be interpreted as a disavowal, by Ibn Rushd, of Ibn Bajja's theory of conjunction. A probable explanation for this is to be found not in Al-Talkhis but in relevant sections within Al-Sharh al-kabir of De Anima, with further evidence also to be found in Sharh ma bad al-tabi`a under the heading Al-Ta' and Al-um.

CHAPTER 3: THE PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS OF IBN RUSHD WITH REFERENCE TO HIS WORKS

## 3.1 INTRODUCTION

Introducing this core chapter in this paper, attempts have been made to explore the peripatetic philosophical ideas he rendered along his works, to briefly define the principles of Islam concerning the philosophical doctrines of Ibn Rushd and to trace the general theological differences among both the doctrines in general. This chapter will look to the inconsistent ideas found in the philosophical works of Ibn Rushd with a similar focus. It will try to give a general idea about the Islamic principles and consistent entity when it has been compared to the remaining ideologies arrived in the world. The purpose of this chapter is to make the understanding of the incoherent ideologies of Ibn Rushd and the consistency of Islamic principles in focus to the certain issues carry out the philosophical and theological importance.

## 3.2 THE FUNCTION OF PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

In twelfth century, philosophy was confronting so many critical approaches from those ones. When it is examined the onset of the critical approach Ibn Rushd tried too much to perform his duty as a philosopher to defend the philosophers from the severe attacks of critics over them from the side of Islamic jurisprudents and theologians especially after the criticism of al Ghazali by writing Thahafuth ul tahafuth, a sharp rebuttal over the doctrines of philosophers. Ibn Rushd defines the relation between philosophy and religion comparing the basic tenets of religion to that of philosophy especially through his writing of faslul maqal [43].

Al Ghazali proclaimed not to believe in their ideas and it is all about irreligious and might be harmful to the Islamic believers. Then, Ibn Rushd aimed by writing faslul maqal fi ma bain al hikmah wal shariah min al ittisal to defend philosophy from the attack of Islamic jurisprudents and theologians, he wished to make philosophy and religion come in terms.

As it is the most important and largely discussed concept in Islamic philosophy it must be mentioned the function of philosophy and religion and how was the accord between them in accordance with the findings of the author.

Three main principles of the religion are the existence of god, the prophecy and the resurrection. Utterly, philosophy can’t cope with that of the ideals of the religion because of the revelation is out of the coverage of the philosophers and that is why philosophy keeps distinct from the religion in this matter. As an effort to harmonize the reason and revelation, Ibn Rushd asserts that the demonstrative truth (aqli) and scriptural truth (naqli) cannot conflict one another. Since religion is true and promotes the study, this leads to the knowledge of the truth where as demonstrative study does not lead to conflict with the scriptures. The law (shar`), as he refers, commands the contemplation of beings and the pursuit of knowledge about them by intellect (aql). Thus, the law (shar`) compels to study philosophy. That is why, as he assumes, there couldn`t be any possibilities of contradiction between philosophy and religion. [44] ‘Anyway philosophy is the twin sister of religion and they are two friends who by their very nature love each other.’ [45]

One of the excellences of Islam, according to Ibn Rushd, is its accessibility and practicality to a wide range of followers. In many of his works, and particularly in his Fasl ul-maqal (Decisive Treatise), he argues that the highest form of wise reasoning cannot clash with the principles of religion. He claims here that philosophers are best able to understand properly the figurative passages in the Qur’an on the basis of their logical training, and that there is no religious condition that all such passages have to be interpreted literally. Philosophers should be vigilant when they do this not to offend the religious sensibilities of the less complicated. Language should be seen as a complicated vehicle for communicating information to different categories of audience. Religion is a means for the easy comprehension of the majority of the people, and where a hidden meaning exists it is up to the philosophers to discover it and keep it to themselves, while the rest of the people must accept the literalness of Scripture (shariath). But through a daring attempt to combine philosophy with religion, though he considers specific theme Islam produces he couldn’t bring both together and instead he made countless attempts to show the magnanimity of the certain philosophical teachings.

The function of philosophy is nothing more than the speculations on the beings and considering them in so far as they lead to the knowledge of creator. [46] It needs to know the creator a rational consideration beyond simple thinking. Demonstration (burhan) is what we call a certain type of reasoning to differentiate between the dialectical and rhetorical deductions. By which one can make a reach out to the knowledge of creator.

‘The objective of religion is defined in philosophical terms to obtain true theory and true practice. In this case we must consider the definition of al kindi to philosophy that is the true knowledge is the knowledge of God. The only way to know god is either apprehension or assent. Men whether they may the philosophers, theologians or the common people they are owed to any one of the three kinds of assent demonstrative, dialectical or rhetorical respectively.’ [47] Then the aim of philosophy resembles that of the religion amply.

## 3.3 IBN RUSHD AS A COMMENTATOR

Most of the works of Ibn Rushd have focused mainly on two aspects of his philosophy: psychology; the theory of the intellect or noetics and his religious philosophy as far as it is seen widely in his faslul maqal and manhijul adilla and in his tahafuthut tahafuth. Even though, his position on any philosophical issues can only understood in tahafuth, which is a better reading than the long repetitive commentaries. Some of the main problems dealt with in tahafuth; creation and emanation versus the eternity of the world, the providence of god and so on, have also made relevant discussions since today.

All of the commentaries written by the author were the mere explanations of Aristotle’s own treatises; rather they do not contain Ibn Rushd’s own philosophy. Since Ibn Rushd’s aim was to follow Aristotle’s philosophy explaining its obscurities and deleting the accretions of later centuries. Though, one could argue that Ibn Rushd followed Aristotle to expound his own ideas, and what he explained in tahafuth and other treatises were derivations upon him to reply for the objections speak up the scope of Aristotelianism and consequently of philosophy. It can be sum marized that Ibn Rushd would have regarded these works as in no way comparable with his scholarly commentaries.

Some of the long commentaries contain many digressions and they are mere extensive, in which he does not explain Aristotle’s meaning literally, sentence by sentence, but elaborates on the main argument and mentions objections of other authors and refuses them. In some of occasions, he even goes beyond Aristotle’s words and expounds what he thinks is implicit in his doctrines.

In addition to the difficulties resulting from reading Aristotle in translation, the text of the philosopher contains many puzzles about which scholars and philosophers are still at variance. This is particularly true of the metaphysical and cosmological views of Aristotle. Whereas the modern tendency has been to regard the inconsistencies of Aristotle’s concepts as being due to the evolution in his thoughts or in different viewpoints adopted in different treatises, Ibn Rushd, like most other cmmentators, has tried to interpret them away or to reconcile them. The ideas that there could have been variations in Aristotle’s thought would have appeared preposterous to Ibn Rushd that there cannot be variations in truthe itself.

## 3.4 ETHICAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

‘The rationalistic aspect of the peripatetic school, reached its terminal point with Ibn Rushd, who became most purely Aristotelian of Muslim peripatetic and rejected those Neo platonic and Muslim elements that had entered into the world view of the eastern peripatetic such as Ibn Sina’. [48] When it is considered the political facets of his works, it is his work made him a lodestar among the thinking scholars along his earlier period of writing, one of his most controversial works, his prominent work in politics, the interpretation of Plato’s Republic, which aims largely the criticism of the existing social order and studies ways to find solutions for it. The peculiarity can be noticed in these works is Ibn Rushd’s style of philosophy applied Plato’s theories to Ibn Rushd’s own times without hesitation, citing chapter and verses of where the political system had failed. He pointed out, the government of Córdoba should have been considered a autocracy from 1145 onward that is, since the end of Almoravid rule and the accession of the current Almohad dynasty, whose head was his patron and he recommended that it is needed to entire alterations along the administrative system of the state. In total, it was the major content of his political works.

Ibn Rushd’s major commentaries on the works of Plato, mainly on his the republic, and Aristotle, show his ample writings of his western thought. The republic was written its commentary with a deep analysis of the chance for society to be changed, and it was to upset some rulers lived there, a little number of Muslim ulama and some catholic theologians as well. It theorizes a well-defined order of politics and how to systematize the administrative setup of a nation or a state. It was thus largely Ibn Rushd’s texts that encouraged the thinkers of the Renaissance, to produce their theories of utopia, [49] or the ideal state. His notion can be attained through human effort and wise leadership and it won him further echelons of respect in the west and has indeed inspired reformers to the present day.

And it shows his ethical philosophy that he presents a firm review of the Ash’arite speculation of moral language, which interprets rightness and wrongness entirely in conformity with the commands of God in holy Quran. The function of that theory is to stress the power and authority of the God over everything, even over the meaning of ethical terms. What we have to do then is merely equal to God’s commands, and we have to do it because God has commanded it, so that everything we need to know about moral behaviour is encapsulated in the teachings of Islam. Ibn Rushd argued that on the contrary, a difference should be drawn between ethical notions and divine commands. Here he follows an Aristotelian approach.

The function of a plant is to grow and the aim of a saw is to cut, but what is the function of a human being? One of our ultimate aims is to be happy and to avoid actions which lead to sadness. According to Ibn Rushd, it is not complex here to align Islamic and Aristotelian principles: moral virtue leads to pleasure since, if we do what we should in accordance with our nature, we will be able to achieve pleasure. This pleasure may be interpreted in a number of ways, either as a mixture of social and religious activities or as an entirely intellectual ideal. However, the latter is possible only for a very no few of us, and neither religion or philosophy would approve of it as the ultimate aim for the majority of the community. [50]

It is miserable that he takes mis­chievous pleasure in comparing the theologians of his own time, the Mutakallimun [51], to Plato’s sophists (soofashayiya [52]). We can’t agree with his idea that he explains the theologians as a real danger to the state and to the purity of Islam. Ibn Rushd suggests to the ruler of that a ban on the publicizing of his administrative set up is too much appropriate for the implementation of the administration of a state. But it is said to be the incoherent political concept because Islam has been configured for an administrative set up accessible for both of the ruler and ruled. Somewhat, his theory of politics could not be practical concerning the administrative systems, which had existed after his time. More over it has been criticized that he did nothing to elucidate these political concepts, other than a mere expansion of the Plato’s concept of politics mentioned in the republic and other works.

In this and many of his other works, Ibn Rushd stresses the importance of a careful understanding of the relationship between religion and philosophy in the state. He insists that revelation (wahy) is superior to philosophy in that it makes its message more widely available than is possible for philosophy.

## 3.5 THE METHODS OF TA'WIL (INTERPRETATION)

“Ta'wil can be explained that there are certain Qur'anic verses which have an apparent (zahir) meaning and an inner (bathin) meaning.

The Ash'arites could interpret some such verses as that of "sitting on the Throne" (al-istiwa'), while the Hanbalites believed in its apparent meaning. But according to Ibn Rushd, Ta'wil is to be practiced only by the philosophers who are the people of demonstration and it must keep back as esoteric knowledge, far from being declared to the common people.

Ibn Rushd finds out the traditional fiqh mainly the principles of Fiqh, depends on four sources: the Qur'an, Tradition, ijma (consensus) and qiyas (legal syllogism). And he is of the opinion that it can be understood that the Qur'an is the only one source which has to be rationally interpreted. Thus, he conveys his strong disagreement with all other principles as it could not be considered.” [53]

As far as he cannot agree with ijma also, he goes to emphasize that “al-Ghazali has no option to opine that they deserve the charge of heresy (kufr) for three things: their doctrine concerning the eternity of the world, their denial of God's knowledge of particulars, and their denial of bodily resurrection. Because, ijma is unanimous consensus of the scholars of a certain time and there was no consensus at any time about doctrinal matters, simply because it is mentioned in the Qur'an as well, that there are some matters which should be concealed. Only "those who are well grounded in learning" (al-rasikhoon fil-'ilmi) has the right to know. Therefore, al-Ghazili has no right to condemn the philosophers as irreligious on the basis of ijma'.

Ibn Rushd now goes on to explain that “religion is based on three principles in which every Muslim should believe. These are the existence of God, the prophecy, and resurrection. These three principles constitute the subject-matter of religion.” [54]

But, as far as the Islamic theological principles are concerned, it can be identified as Quran says just before those verses Ibn Rushd cited above that ‘some of the verses of the Quran are ambiguous (muthashabihath) for the public and what they mean is only Allah’s knowledge and those ‘who are well grounded in learning (rasikoona fil ilmi), recognized by the public of certain time and they must be qualified to make ijthihad even as they are one who is deserved to make his personal observations according to the creed of Islam. Thus, doubtlessly it can be understood that al Ghazali is of this crew and no one can deny his charge of heresy against the philosophers as they made their arguments in contrary to the Islamic law (shariath).

Prophet (S.A) has declared that ‘my community must not gather on deviation from the truth’. That is why it can be determined that these like qualified scholars (ulama) can define certain specific ambiguous religious matters according to the necessity of time. Anyway, it is clear that the ambiguous instructions in the holy Quran and hadith must be interpreted by the well-grounded ones to share those things and copy them in to the holy creed of Islam. Thus, philosophers can’t go with their doctrine with the religious interpretation because the fact has been recognized that they don’t deserve the position of well-grounded in Islamic teachings.

## 3.6 PROPHETHOOD (NUBUWATH)

In case of prophet hood, Ibn Rushd severely criticizes that “theologians assume that the belief in the truth of the prophets lies in the belief in their miraculous acts, which are supernatural. And he ascribes that the Qur'an refuses to follow this way which was common to previous religions. For instance, he adds, ‘When the Arabs told Muhammad that they would not believe in him unless he made a spring flow from the dry earth, he answered through God's revelation: "I am only a human being, a messenger." The only miracle of Islam is its Holy Book, the Qur'an, which comprises the laws necessary for the well-being of man. Thus, there is nothing supernatural, since everything goes on according to natural laws resulting from the close association of causes and effects.” [55]

According to Ibn Rushd, the prophet can perform things which the philosopher cannot such as teaching the masses, understanding the future, establishing religious laws and contributing to the pleasure of the whole of humanity. Through divine revelation (wahy) or inspiration, the prophet establishes laws which make it possible for people to attain an understanding of how they should behave. The qualifications of the prophet are to be established by political skill. Miracles (mu’jizath) are irrelevant here; only legislative abilities count. The philosopher has all the theoretical knowledge which the prophet has, but only the latter can embody this knowledge in a law and persuade the general public that this is a law which must be obeyed.

And Ibn Rushd asserts what the prophet has is practical knowledge as well as the theoretical knowledge of the philosopher, and so the prophetic law (shari’a) is similar to the philosophical law (namus).

But according to Islamic theological principles, in accordance with the words of imam sa’ad udhin thafthazani, ‘the second kind of the causes of knowledge is the narrative of the Messenger aided by an evidentiary miracle (mu'jiza). A Messenger (rasool) is a man sent by Allah to creatures in order to convey His judgments; and the bringing of a book may be stipulated of him, in contrast to a prophet (al-nabi) for "prophet" is a more general term. An evidentiary miracle is something that annuls the customary way of things (khariq lil-aada), the purpose of which is to demonstrate the truthfulness of the one making the claim to be the Messenger of Allah.’ [56]

## 3.7 CAUSALITY (SABABIYYAH:)

[57]

The famous thinker M.M sheriff [58] underlines that the creation is an act of God. He created the world providentially, not by chance. The world is well ordered and is in a state of the most perfect regularity, which proves the existence of a wise Creator. Causality is presupposed. All the Rushdian proofs depend on the belief that nothing comes to be without a cause and that there is a definite series of causes emanating from a Prime Cause. [59]

Ibn Rushd says in his Tahafuthul tahafuth in contrary to the strong explanation of Imam al Ghazali in Tahafuthul falasifah: “Logic implies the existence of causes and effects, and knowledge of these effects can only be rendered perfect through knowledge of their causes. Denial of cause implies the denial of knowledge, and denial of knowledge implies that nothing in this world can be really known, and that what is supposed to be known is nothing but opinion, that neither proof nor definition exist, and that the essential attributes which compose definitions are void. The man who denies the necessity of any item of knowledge must admit that even this, his own affirmation, is not necessary knowledge”. [60]

Thus, Ibn Rushd refers as illogical to deny all causal links merely because one does not wish causal links to be reduced merely to those types of efficient causation. Which are perceptible to humans, those things whose causes are not evident are still unknown and must be investigated, precisely because their causes are not evident; and since everything whose causes are not evident is still unknown by nature and must be investigated, it follows necessarily that what is not unknown has causes which are evident. The man who reasons like the theologians do not differentiate between what is self-evident and what is unknown.

It is to be analyzed here that the causality of every things returns unto God. Al-Ghazali asserts against causality along with his sharp criticism on various philosophical facets which come in contrast to the religious norms even in the case of fire burning a piece of cotton, the agent of the burning is not the fire, but God, ‘through His creating the black in the cotton and the disconnection of its parts’. Because, it is God “who made the cotton burn and made it ashes either through the intermediacy of angels or without intermediacy.” Repeated human remarks of fire burning cotton prove that there is no other cause but God. [61]

As Ghazali puts it forward, the difference or relation between the cause and effect is not necessary to present it as a matter. ‘Because, this is not that and that won’t be this. The affirmation one does not imply to that of the other and the denial of the one does not imply to that of the other. That is why the existence of one is not necessitated by the non existence of the other.’ [62] Al Ghazali asserts his position and that of the Asharites that the principles do not act by choice or that God does not act by will.

Likewise, in citing a story from the holy Quran, philosophers say that when Ibrahim (A S) was thrown into fire the fire re majored fire but he was free after all even from a small wound that is why this could only be possible through abstracting the warmth from the fire or through changing the essence of Ibrahim (A S), and making him a stone or something on which fire has no influence, and neither the one nor the other is possible. Unless, he may had to be burned as occurred in case of the pieces of cotton.

Al Ghazali answers clearly that the fire can burn two pieces of cotton as it cannot discriminate between two similar things, whereas we can believe that when certain prophet was thrown into fire, he was not burnt because there must have originated from god, from the angels a new attribute in the fire which confined its heat to itself, so that the heat was not communicated to the prophet. Or there might have originated a new attribute in the prophet’s body which enabled it to resist the influence of fire, although it had not ceased to be composed of flesh and bones. [63]

‘The real essences (al-haqiqa) of things exist in reality and that the knowledge of them is verifiable. The causes of knowledge for all creation are three: the sound senses, true narrative (khabaru swadiq), and Reason, ’ [64] is a better description for the confusion in the causes of knowledge and different arguments on it. ‘True narrative (khabaru swadiq), is of two kinds: one of them is the mutawatir narrative, and it is the narrative established by the tongues of people of whom it is in conceivable that they would agree together on a falsehood. It brings about necessary knowledge such as the knowledge of former kings in past times and of distant countries. The second kind is the narrative of the Messenger aided by an evidentiary miracle, and it brings about deductive knowledge, and the knowledge established by it resembles the knowledge established by necessity in certainty and in fixity.’ [65] Of course this is a clear picture drawn by Sa’ad Udhin Thafthazani in his Sharhul Aqayid and we can find answer to any kind of confusions arise in the time of the discussion over the matter of the causes of knowledge.

As far as the explanation of Saad dhin thafthazani is concerned, the causal relation to everything is to be divided into three: the sense perception which is hearing, seeing, touching, smell, and taste; the true narrative; either muthawathir or narrative of the messenger, prophet who is sent from Allah into people to convey his message with the support of evidentiary miracle and what is caused to know by the reason (aql).

So, it is deniable of course the argument of causality presented by Ibn Rushd that everything is referred as a result of a prime cause. Rather, it became clear by the explanation of Islamic principles of famous theologian Saad dhin thafthazani that the cause of the knowledge is as it was mentioned earlier. And it can be said that the doctrine of Ibn Rushd in this case which may lead to the deviation a certain sects came after him. Furthermore, it is their attempt to deny the creation of the world is an act of god because, what eternally exists cannot be produced by being a temporal. So, a temporal origin is indispensable for an action. That is why they cannot indeed deny these facts and affirm that the causes and effects result in the actions and the creation was accidental from the God.

The omniscience of God, his creation of the world and his own existence shows the cause is the intellect (aql) and scripture (shar’) too. The burning of a piece of cotton with fire shows the cause is the intellect (aql). It means the cause results the knowledge and these causes are used as tools to know the fact of burning of fire. And, also by the knowledge of divine creation of fire in such a course can only attained by the intellect (aql). So, these are the causes of knowledge result in every case whereas the philosophers assert that either intellect or five senses can only cause the knowledge to the beings. The scriptural knowledge from hadith and the holy Quran as it is the major part of the religious teachings. They ascribed the intellect as another which results assumption, experience and information on the rise of every issues. All of these will cause from the scripture (shar’). These are all the assertions of the theologians configure the problematic strands and refer the causes of every occurrence eventually they reach into the establishment of the fact on the existence of the God and his attributes. And it is the answer for the flimsy arguments of philosophers arise in this issue.

## 3.8 ALLAH AND HIS ATTRIBUTES (SWIFATH)

Karan Amstrong [66] underscores ‘the philosophers had to subscribe to the creed of obligatory doctrines which Ibn Rushd listed as follows:

-The existence of God as Creator (swani’) and sustainer of the world.

-The unity of God.

-The attributes (swifath) of knowledge, power, will, hearing, seeing, and speech which are given to God throughout the Quran.

-The uniqueness and incomparability of God clearly asserted in Quran [67] “there is nothing like unto him”.

-The creation of world by God.

-The validity of prophesy (nubuwath).

-The justice of God.

-The resurrection of the body (jasad) on the last day’. [68]

We cannot agree indeed with this author fully that he goes astray from the religious norms to that of his personal views by which he became satisfied whereas Ibn Rushd’s famous work al kashf an manahijil adillah is almost around this metaphysical issue to find out the road to the god and its methods mentioned in the holy Quran regarding the existence of god and the knowledge about his attributes. The core of al-Ghazali’s attack on philosophical ideas in this issue and entirely it is centered on the relationship between ‘God and the world’.

The Muslim philosophers, following Aristotle’s Neoplatonic commentators, affirm that God’s self-knowledge implies His knowledge of all universals. In man this knowledge forms a plurality, in God it is unified. Ibn Sina subscribes to the Qur’anic words that no particle in Heaven or Earth escapes God’s knowledge, but he holds, as prophets had done before, that God can know the particular things only in a universal way, whatever this means. Ghazali takes it to mean that God, according to Avicenna, must be ignorant of individuals, a most heretical theory. For Ibn Rushd, God’s knowledge is neither universal nor particular, but transcending both, in a way unintelligible to the human mind.

Regarding the knowledge of God, Ibn Rushd seems to subscribe to the view of the philosophers that God apprehends His own being only. With the philosophers this supposition is necessary in order that God may retain His unity, for if He should recognize the multiplicity of things, He would have multiplicity in His own being. This line of thinking forces God to live entirely within Himself and has knowledge of the existence of His own self only and nothing besides that. In this case God’s omniscience becomes doubtful. Obviously, this was only a twisted interpretation of the doctrine of the philosophers forced upon them by the theologians in order to bring them to an embarrassing predicament.

The philosophers agree that the world has a maker that the god is the maker or the agent of the world and that the world is his action or product. Here are three reasons arise in accordance with these doctrines the nature of the action, the nature of the agent and the relationship between the action and the agent. According to first reason, it is essential for an agent to have free will for the action on contrast to that of the philosophers they insist that god has no free will and he has no attribute at all so whatever precedes him is a necessary consequence. And as per the second one, the reason found in the action is that an action must have a beginning in time. And the last and third reason is what is found in the relationship between the action and the agent is according to them god is one and only one proceeds from one. But how can we agree with this idea as the world is composed of different things and how can it proceed from him?

Ibn Rushd’s system has greater elasticity; it vouchsafes that God in the knowledge of His own essence knows all the things of the world, for finally He is the ultimate sources and ground of them all. God’s knowledge is not like that of man’s; it is a higher kind of knowledge of which we humans can form no idea. This is because God would have sharers in His knowledge if such happens. Furthermore, God’s knowledge like that of human beings is not derived from things; rather things derive their being through God’s knowing them. God’s act of creating and knowing is the same in the since that God’s knowledge is verily the cause through which things come into existence. Ibn Rushd does not circumscribe God’s knowledge merely to the universals. For him it is not legitimate to make the distinction between the particulars and the universals with references to God’s knowledge; this distinction is of human origin and does not apply to God. God’s knowledge can be called neither particular nor universal. Hence the accusation of the theologians that the system of Ibn Rushd leaves no scope for God’s omniscience or knowledge of the world with its multiplicity of particulars is altogether unfounded.

As god is an agent, he is not conceivable that god have been able to avoid his action such as the shadow is unavoidable to a person or the light is to the sun. Here, we see that the light is not the creation of the sun but it is depended on it and the action of the sun is inescapable to the being of its light. Here the agent is on the whole a cause, and the lamp is the cause of the illumination as the sun is the cause of light. So, the agent of the action is the ultimate cause for the creation of the world and all the heavenly bodies and the whole things excluding him.

Ibn Rushd says on the attributes of god that God is qualified by seven main attributes knowledge, life, power, will, audition, sight, and speech. They are human qualifications considered in their absolute. He continues that the common people may believe according to the apparent meaning of the text that He sees, hears, speaks, etc. The people of demonstration should not expound their interpretation before the masses. The doctrines of both the Mu'tazilites and the Ash'arites are unsound. Ibn Rushd criticizes their solutions in his book al­Manahij and at length in the Tahafut. He holds that in the case of the attri­butes, without affirming or negating them, one must follow the apparent meaning mentioned in the Qur'an. As to philosophical interpretation, this must be kept esoteric.

“After the discourse of Ibn Rushd on the affirmation of causality, he tries to exemplify his concepts on the attributes of Allah are only the agents to subscribe the causes from him. So, the causes have been transferred through his attributes and these are the agents of those causes. So, he asserts that the god is the real agent of all the actions of all the creatures.

Along with his insistence that the God is a real agent, al-Ghazali was concerned to provide God with real knowledge of the everyday events of the world he created. Ibn Sina argued that God is limited to knowing only very general and abstract features of the world, since any other sort of knowledge would diminish him as an eternal and immaterial being. al-Ghazali objects that any God which is acceptable to Islam must know the everyday events of our world. Ibn Rushd suggests that on the contrary, this would make God into someone very like his creatures and would provide him with knowledge that is beneath his dignity. God’s knowledge is superior and unique because he is not limited to receiving information from the world, as is the case with finite creatures like human beings. He is the Creator (swani’) of the objects in the world, and he knows them in a more perfect and completes way than we can hope to attain. This opinion added by Ibn Rushd suggests that God cannot know individuals as such. The best knowledge is abstract and universal, and this is the sort of knowledge which God can be thought to enjoy.” [69]

Imam Thafthazani concludes in ‘the creed of islam’ as ‘He has attributes from all eternity subsistent in His essence. They are not He nor are they other than Him. And they are Knowledge and Power and Life and Might and Hearing and seeing and willing and Desiring and Doing and Creating and Sustaining. It is known that each of these attributes points to a neither Idea superadded to what is understood by the term "the Necessarily Existent, " nor are these attributes to be taken as synonymous terms. Furthermore, if a derivative term can be properly predicated of a thing, that thing necessarily possesses the source from which that term is derived. And thus, it has been established that Allah possesses the attributes of Knowledge, Power, Life, and so on. This is unlike the view of the Mu'tazilites, who asserts that Fie is to know without possessing Knowledge; He is Powerful without possessing Power, and so on. But this view of theirs is self-evidently impossible, for it is analogous to our saying, "A thing is black but there is no blackness in it." And furthermore, it has already been established in the statutes (al-nusus) that Allah possesses Knowledge, Power, and other attributes. Finally, the procession from Allah of acts of which He has perfect understanding points to the existence of Knowledge and Power in Him, not merely to the fact that He can be described as Knowing and Powerful.’ [70]

Imam Thafthazani referred the attributes of Allah as ‘they are not he nor they other than him’. It is a mere explanation carries deft meanings of the criticism of Ibn Rushd’s philosophical doctrines that suggests that god is the real agent and all other causes are giving the results of the actions because, ‘these are neither He nor they other than him’. But these are being possessed from him.

So, every attribute are his essentialities and must be possessed from him. These are not be possessed from him. These are the ideas superadded to the term ‘necessarily existent’ (wajibul wujood), where as these are not to be considered as synonymous terms because, every attribute have been possessed from Allah in its completion according to the significance of every single attributes. Then, it can be assumed that the philosophical doctrines of Ibn Rushd on Allah and his attributes could not be considered as plausible as far as the clarifications of the Islamic principles.

## 3.9 FREE WILL AND PREDESTINATION (QALAA’ AND QADR)

It is a problem which led different Muslim sects to be divided in accordance with different views in theological principles and even to charge heresy and blasphemy each other.it is one of the core attributes of Allah. Allah has free will and he predestines good and bad, vices and virtues for every being in the whole world. So, the man is predestined and he acquires the power to act. That is the acquisition (kasb) in contrary to Ibn Rushd’s view it is self-contradictory and which leads to fatalism. [71]

Ibn Rushd asserts that Allah is just and never does injustice to none. He has created ‘good’ essentially and ‘bad’ accidentally for the ‘good’. Good and bad are similar to fire which has many uses for the well being of things, yet in some cases it may be harmful. This Rushdian theory supports the optimism that prevails in the world and which sponsored fatalism which is irregular to Islamic principles.

According to Ibn Rushd, the term al qadaa (free will) refers to the perfect commanding, decreeing, ruling and accomplishing and perfect precision in execution while al qadr (Predestination) refers to the setting, commanding, executing, and encompassing in due and precise proportions. Holy Quran underlines that ‘then he completed and finished from their creation as seven heavens in two days and he made each heaven its affairs [72]’.

This problem has led Muslims to be divided into two groups. The one believed that man’s wickedness or virtue is his own acquirement and that according to these he will be either punished or rewarded. These are the Mutazilites. The belief of the other party is quite opposed to this. They say that man is compelled to do his deeds. They are the Jabarites. The Asharites say that man can do action, but the deeds done, and the power of doing it, are both created by God. This is the ultimate idea given by Asharites and this is the most accepted one according to us.

Al Ashari founder of school, Abul Hasanil Ashari [73], which was named after him, took an almost completely opposing stand on all major issues advocated by the mu’thazilah. Al ashari, in his al ibnah as usul al diyanah, uses al qadr in an active sense to affirm God’s power of determination and that, both good and bad, are attributed to God. While in kitab al luma, he defines al qadaa as the decree of god which is a creation and includes what is right, such as acts of obedience and what god has not prohibited, and it also includes what is wrong, such as unbelief and acts of disobedience.

Al Ghazali discusses al qadaa and al qadr in the same manner, namely, that god, who created man, his powers and his movements, also created all his actions and that all his actions are dependent upon god’s power. He argues firstly, since the power of god is perfect and unlimited, it cannot but the actions of man be created by god. And secondly, since all man’s actions are dependent upon the power of god, there is no reason to differentiate some movements of man from all man’s actions, as their very essence is equally dependent upon god. It is obvious the basis of Al Ghazali’s argument is aimed to quash the view that differentiates certain actions by man over which god has power and certain actions of man over which has no power.

So that, with no doubt, to believe in al qada and al qadar is not to deny man freedom of choice.

Surah Al Insan refers to this truth ‘has there not been a man over period of time, when he was a thing worth mentioning? Verily we had created man from nuthfa, in order to try him so we made him hearer and seer. Verily we showed him the way whether he be grateful or ungrateful’ [74]. this is the concept of free will clearly mentioned in holy Quran and what Sunni scholars generally advocate.

Imam Thafthazani speaks about this issue in contrast to that of the philosophers with ultimate evidences show the fact. ‘The question on the justice of Allah, which was a rallying point for the Mu'tazilites [75] as well, went back to very early debates about the punishment of sins and man's responsibility for his actions. Christian teaching regarding predestination influenced these controversies even though discussion was inevitable from what appeared in the Qur'an and Traditions. Allah is described as having created the world and established His decrees in eternity. Some creatures are destined to do ‘good’, others to do ‘evil’; some are Believers, others are Unbelievers. Men are also urged to repent and turn to Allah. Had it been possible to identify absolutely the body of Believers with those who do ‘good’ and obtain entrance into jannah, and the Unbelievers with those who do ‘evil’ and deserve the hell, there would have been little place for dispute. The Qadarites [76], who appear to have been forerunners of the Mu'tazilites, said that man possessed free will to choose good deeds. The Kharijites [77] taught that one who committed a great sin must be an Unbeliever; the orthodox Muslims, influenced by the Murji'ite [78] teaching which delayed judgment on sinners, since it is Allah who passes judgment, said that the professing Muslim who is an evil-doer should not be considered an Unbeliever. The Mu'tazilite position also hinted at delay or at least uncertainty by saying that the evil-doer is in a middle position and not to be identified with the Believers or the Unbelievers. In general, they held that his final destiny rests on his actions and on the absolute justice of Allah. Faith is not granted freely to some and withheld from others. Allah acts for the good and the guidance of man. If man accepts, he enters jannah; if he refuses, he receives the punishment he deserves.

As to the statement of the Asharites, philosophers answer that God sometimes does things which He does not like, and orders others which He does not want, God forbid us from holding such a view about him, for it is pure infidelity.

God is just and never does injustice to man, as declared in the Qur'an. The nature of man is not absolutely good, although good is dominant. The majority of mankind is good. God has created ‘good’ essentially, and ‘bad’ accidentally for the good. Good and bad are similar to fire which has many uses for the well-being of things, yet in some cases it may be harmful. This Rushdian theory supports the optimism that prevails in the world.

The Asharites [79] have expressed a very clear opinion to elucidate the religious facets on divine justice and injustice; both with regard to reason and religion. They say that in this problem the case of the invisible world is quite opposed to the visible. They confirm that God is just or unjust within the limits of religious actions. So when a man’s action is just with regard to religion, he also is just; and whatever religion calls it to be unjust, He is unjust say that whatever has not been imposed as a divinely ordained duty upon men, does not come within the four walls of religion. He is neither just nor unjust, but all His actions about such things are just. They have laid down that there is nothing in itself which may be called just or unjust. But to say that there is nothing which may in it be called good or bad is simply intolerable. Justice is known as good and injustice as bad.

## 3.10 CREATION OF THE WORLD

As far as the doctrine of the eternity of the world is concerned, he does not deny the principle of creation but only offers an explanation of it which is different from that given by the theologians. Ibn Rushd apparently seems to submit that the world is eternal but at the same time makes the important distinction, as empathetically as he can, between the eternity of God and the eternity of the world. There are two kinds of eternities: eternity with cause and eternity without cause. The world is eternal because of a creative and moving agent eternally working upon it; God, on the other hand, is eternal without a cause. The priority of God to the world does not consist with reference to time; God’s existence does not imply time, since He exists solely in timeless eternity. God’s priority to the world consists solely in His being its cause and that from all eternity. For Ibn Rushd there is no creation ex nihilo once for all, but rather a creation renewed from moment to moment. According to his views, a creative power is perpetually at work in the world, moving it and maintaining it. it is easy to reconcile this notion with that of evolution and even with the Bergsonian [80] type of evolution, through with Ibn Rushd it is not so much the creatures as the creative power which evolved, the final result being the same.

Likewise what happened before in those arguments, the same we can see that philosophers here also fail to reach into the truth and they are not ready to go with that of the Asharites’ theological ideas.

The world along with the totality of its parts, the heavens and what is in them and the earth and what is on it, is a thing originated, that is, everything except Allah of the existent things (al-maujudat) by which the Maker is known, is called the world of bodies (al-ajsam), the world of accidents (al-a'ral), the plant world (al nabat), the animal world (al-hayavan), and so on. The attributes of Allah are excluded [from the things making up the world] because they are not other than His essence, just as they are not the essence itself.

This means the world is something brought from non-existence into existence, meaning that it was once non-existent (ma'dum) and then it existed. This is in opposition to the Philosophers, insofar as they held to the position of the eternity (qidam) of the heavens, including their respective matters (mawadd), forms (suwar), and shapes (ashkal), and the eternity of the sub-lunar elements (al-anasir) including their respective matters and forms, but these forms are only specific forms, inasmuch as the elements were never without form. Definitely, the Philosophers used the term "being originated" with reference to that which is not Allah, but they used it in the sense of being dependent on something else, not in the sense of being preceded by non-existence. [81]

So, we can simply understand what the word ‘originated’ means as it was referred by imam thafthazani above that is something brought from non-existence into existence not it is dependent on something else. It shows their tenacity to agree with the idea of Asharites and they are standing firmly on their rubbish discourse.

Imam thafthazani continues in his work about the creation of universe that ‘In the matter of the origin of the universe the Qur'an everywhere teaches that Allah is Creator and Maker. Repeatedly man's nothingness is contrasted with the power and wisdom of Allah who brings all things into existence. Most Muslim philosophers, through the use of an amalgam of the Neoplatonic [82] Chain and the Aristotelian Cosmos, came to look at the world not so much as a creation but an emanation from the Deity. The language of the Qur'an, because of its implicit pantheism, lent itself to this interpretation. Both al-Ash'arl and al-Maturldi [83] believed that Allah had created the universe out of nothing. This created world consists of substances and accidents; the former subsist in themselves, the latter only in something else. But the unique contribution of Islam in the realm of philosophy was an elaborate atomic theory which is a combination of material atoms and time atoms into a complete system to explain the origin and working process of the universe. Maimonides [84], who gives in The Guide for the Perplexed a most systematic summary of the theory, says that Muslims borrowed it from the Greek philosophers but notes that there are fundamental differences between the Muslim position and that of Epicurus [85] and other atomists [86]. al-Baqillanl [87] has been called the original atomist among the Muslims.

This is a matter for consideration, inasmuch as this is the meaning of "eternal" and of "originated" according to what the Philosophers say. But "the originated" is defined by the Mutakallims as that thing the existence of which had a beginning, meaning that its existence was preceded by nonexistence; and "the eternal" is the contrary of this. The mere connection of the originated thing with something else does not require, according to this meaning, that it be originated, but mere connection permits it to be in need of something else, proceeding from it and lasting as long as it lasts, which is just what the Philosophers held in claiming that its eternity is one of the possible, just like primary matter (al-hayulah), for example. Certainly whenever we establish, by means of a proof that does not rest on the origination of the world, which the world preceded from the Maker by His choice rather than of necessity, then the proposition that its existence is connected with the Creating of Allah is a proposition that it is originated. And from this one may go on to say that it applies to every part of the world, thereby answering the one who asserts that some parts, like primary matter, are eternal. Or the Philosophers maintain that some parts are eternal, meaning that they were not preceded by non-existence, which, however, does not mean that the world was not created by something outside itself.

The conclusion to be drawn from this is that we do not admit that Creating is inconceivable without the existence of the created thing, and that Creating has the same relation to the thing created as the act of striking has to the one struck. Striking is an attribute showing relationship which is inconceivable without the two things related, namely, the striker and the one struck, but Creating is a real attribute that is the basis for the relationship, which is the bringing of the non-existent out from non-existence into existence, but not the relationship itself. Yet even where it the relationship itself, according to the terminology used by the Early Theologians, then the proposition, which verifies this relationship as true without there being a thing which was actually created, would be a contention and a denial of that which is necessary. And this proposition that Creating bears the relation to the thing created that striking does to the thing struck] is not to be rejected by saying that striking is an accident the continuance of which is impossible; for [even if it is an accident] it must be connected with the thing acted upon, and pain must pass on to the thing acted upon, inasmuch as it exists at the same time as the action, since where it delayed it would become non-existent. This is unlike the action of the Creator. His action is from eternity and of necessity endures, continuing until the time of the existence of the thing acted upon.’ [88]

Al Ghazali elucidates the discourse of them in the incoherence of the philosophers that ‘The philosophers assert that the world is an action of god and is to be found in a condition for an action. Here, an action must have a beginning in time. But according to their discourse, the world is eternal (khadeem) not temporal. An action means something to come out of non existence into existence with a temporal origin. In this case it is inconceivable because what eternally exists cannot be produced by being given a temporal origin. So a temporal origin is an indispensable for an action. Then, how can they consider that the world is eternal despite these clinching evidences?’

The demonstration of these arguments between the theologians and philosophers is the judgment that the world, what is other than him and his attributes, is temporal (haadith) and all is created by Allah. So, all of these creatures were brought from non existence to existence by the omnipotent Allah.

## 3.11 THE SOUL (ROOH)

Ibn Rushd left behind nearly ten treatises on the soul (nafs), the intellect ('aqi) and conjunction (ittisal), all of which are lost in the original Arabic, with the exception of an addendum to the doctrine of the rational faculty within an Epitome (Mint tasar) of the De Anima in the Cairo manuscript; this addendum being, apparently, a commentary or part of a commentary on the Risalat al-ittisal of Ibn Bajja Most of it is in Hebrew and Latin translations.

Sir Muhammed Iqbal says that ‘In history of Muslim thought, Ibn Rushd approached the question of immortality from a purely metaphysical point of view and ventures to think, achieved no results. He drew a distinction between sense and intelligence probably because of the expressions nafs and ruh used in the Quran. These expressions, apparently suggesting a conflict between two opposing principles in man, have misled many a thinker in Islam. However, if Ibn Rushd`s dualism was mistaken, for the word ‘nafs’ does not seem to have been used in the Quran in any technical sense the kind imagined by Muslim theologians intelligence, according to Ibn Rushd, is not a form of the body it belongs to a different order of being, and transcends individuality. It is there for universal and eternal. Which means since unitary intellect transcends individuality, its appearance as so many unities in multiplicity of human persons is a mere illusion. The eternal unity of intellect means the everlastingness of humanity and civilization, not the personal immortality.’ [89]

Here we can check it out the arguments of the philosophers in the issue of the soul. ‘They argue mainly the soul can be perished following three:

1. Along with the death of the body.

2. By the occurrence of the contrary of the soul which comes to replace it.

3. By the power of a powerful agent.’

Here, it is false to say that ruin of the soul is the ruin of the body too because the body is not the bedrock of the soul. It is only a tool used by the soul with the intermediation of certain powers which subsist in the body. So, the ruin of the tool must not need the ruin of one who uses this tool. [90]

So, he remembers that Aristotle's thesis on the immortality of the soul is that all Made entities generable and corruptible composed of matter and form. Major Issue, the same that eventually become infrastructure, does not exist unless it is 'Science' and as such, is really synonymous with pure possibility.

In this case, this argument is based upon the theory that the death of the body does not cause death of the soul because of the soul does not subsist in the body which has died, not because of the body is a tool used by the soul.

Secondly, though they don’t consider the soul as subsisting in body, yet it is evident that there is a connection between the soul and the body because a soul does not come into existence unless a body exists. In total, Ibn Rushd is firm on this opinion that the human soul is related to its body, as Form is to Matter. He is completely in earnest on this point. The theory of numerous immortal souls he most decidedly rejects, combating Ibn Sina. He insists that the soul has an existence only as a completion of the body with which it is associated. [91]

Ibn Rushd appears to argue that as we become more involved with immortal and eternal knowledge, and with universal and abstract principles, our mind becomes identical to a degree with those objects of knowledge. So, once we have perfected ourselves intellectually and know everything that there is to know about the formal structure of reality, there is no longer really any `us’ around to do the knowing. Ibn Rushd regards our progress in knowledge as equivalent to a lessening of our ties with our material and individual human characteristics, with the radical result that if anything survives death, it must be the species and not the individual. Temporal and finite creatures are destructible, but as members of a species we are permanent, although only the species itself is entirely free from destruction.

And its response has been clearly expressed the entire proof for the non divisibility of the human soul through the works of al ghazali that there is a reason to reject the division of the soul as incompatible with the need for rational. Let's imagine whether the soul of Zaid is identical with that of Amr? If identical, it would be ridiculous, for each one of the two knowing that it is not the same as any other state. If souls are the same, they are equal with respect to cognition. But if you say that the soul of Zaid is not the soul of Amr and that this duplication is required as a result of the division of the two souls’ relationship to the bodies, and it can be concluded that the division that is one which does not have the size or the amount is obviously impossible. How it can become and that is one of the two and then restores the oneness? Something like this can be visualized in the case, which has the size or quantity. The presence of both knowledge and ignorance in an individual's personality is an absolute impossibility, while they can be found separately in two different people. Both green and black cannot be on eye, while the eyes of two different people can be green and black. This indicates that the soul is indivisible object. All agreed learned of all ages to lead the human mind to believe that the human soul is a part of the universe, which is an integral part because part belongs to all, and here there is no whole. It can be called part only in the sense in which we can assume to be one part of the ten. It is absurd to think that it occupies space, because this implies division session. It is a mistake to think of something that occupies space, and so far does not allow division. This is against the rules of logic and engineering sciences. If an individual atom is between two other atoms, not one of the two sides to come into contact with the same thing the other, or are two different things?

## 3.12THE DAY OF RESURRECTION

According to the philosophers, the fact that it is a substance independent of a body and is immaterial shows that a corruption of the body cannot affect it. This, as a matter of fact, is a truism, since the meaning of substantiality and immateriality for the philosophers implies already the idea of eternity. On the other hand, if the soul is the form of the body, as is also affirmed by them, it can only exist with its matter and the mortality of its body would imply its own mortality, as Ghazali rightly points out. The Arabic philosophers through their combination of Platonism and Aristotelianism hold, indeed, at the same time three theories inconsistent with each other, about the relation of body and soul: that the soul is the form of the body, that the soul is a substance, subsistent by itself and immortal, and that the soul after death takes a pneumatic body (a theory already found in Porphyry). Besides, their denial of the Platonic idea of pre-existence of the soul vitiates their statement that the soul is a substance, subsistent by itself, that is, eternal, ingenerated, and incorruptible.

Although Ibn Rushd in his whole book tries to come as near to the Aristotelian conception of the soul as possible, in this chapter he seems to adopt the eschatology of the Late Greek authors. He allows to the souls of the dead a pneumatic body and believes that they exist somewhere in the sphere of the moon. He also accepts the theory of the Djinn, the equivalent of the Greek Daimones. What he rejects, and what the philosophers generally reject, is the resurrection of the flesh. [92]

Some Islamic theologians express that when you pass the death of the body and the reactions of the physical and chemical come to an end, everything to the point of termination. However, when the resurrection occurs, and reassembled on the human form clouds of particles that have been buried in the ground, scattered in the air, or drowned in the ocean. When the body and thus begins a new life, it is very important for the soul, which is one of the characteristics of the mechanism of the body also to return to life.

Al Ghazali counters the argument that Scripture (shar’) has affirmed in no uncertain terms that the soul survives the destruction of the body at death, as the philosophers actually admit, but is reunited to the same body or one similar to it on the Day of Resurrection - a thesis which the philosophers deny.

Al-Ghazali brought against philosophy that it fails to allow the physical resurrection of human beings and the provision of physical rewards and punishments appropriate to their behaviour during their lives. He has in mind here the Aristotelian notion of the soul, which makes the idea of an afterlife complex to grasp. This is because the soul is the form of the living being, an aspect of the being itself, and there is no point in talking about the matter existing without the form when we are considering living creatures. Persons are combinations of soul and body (jasad), and in the absence of the latter there are no persons left.

On the Day of Judgment and the resurrection of the bodies, philosophers believe that the body will be different from our present body, which what we have today. This is only temporary, that will be eternal. For this also there are religious arguments. Ibn Rushd is based upon the kinds of principles, in which there is no disagreement according to all men: the one being that the soul is immortal, and the second is that the return of the souls into other bodies does not look as impossible as the return of the bodies themselves. It is so because the material of the bodies here is found following and passing from one body to another, i.e., one and the same matter is found in many people and in many different times. The same example of bodies cannot be found one more time, because their matter is the same. For instance, a man dies and his body becomes dissolved into earth. The earth ultimately becomes dissolved into vegetable, which is eaten by quite a different man from whom another man comes into being. If we suppose them to be different bodies, then our aforesaid view cannot be true.

CHAPTER 4: IBN RUSHD AND HIS disagreement with THE PHILOSOPHERS AND THEOLOGIANS

## 4.1 INTRODUCTION

On the basis of their concepts in creation of the world and some other philosophical matters, Ibn Rushd divides the philosophers into five categories.

1. The upholders of creation ex nihilo, they are Muslim and Christian theologians.

2. Those who maintain that everything is in everything and comes into being by differtiation.

These are two extremist schools. And the third one occurs between both of them.

3. Those who believe in a supernatural agent implanting the forms in matter, such as Ibn sina.

4. Those who believe in two different agencies: an immanent one and a transcendent one, such as Themistius and al Farabi

5. The doctrine of Aristotle, the truth. The agent produces neither the form nor the matter bur the compound of the two.Although it is quite clear that Ibn Rushd regards himself as belonging to this last category, there are many evidences that he was not influenced by many of them for instance, his opinion in the process of generation by the sun and the stars whose motions depend upon the divine mind.

Fifty years after the attack of al Ghazali, peripatetic philosophers started to attack against the attack of theologians and it led to ample writings in this context. So, Ibn Rushd starts to define his philosophical perspectives through over his works criticizing the critiques severely concerning the strong reproach of al Ghazali and the accusations of other theologians. In this chapter, the encounter with al Ghazali, criticism over Alexander and Ibn Bajja and the disagreement with ibn sina with a sharp focus into the contradictory phrases from the works along with the response to their arguments.

## 4.2 ENCOUNTER WITH AL-GHAZALI

When al-Ghazali wrote tahafuthu tahafuth (Incoherence of incoherence) explaining his arguments in favour of creation of ex nihilo [93], God’s omniscience and the resurrection of the dead became widely accepted in Islamic world and it welcomed the death of philosophical thoughts belonging Aristotelian mindset. And when it was translated into Latin it was accepted by Christian world as well. It was appealed his great visions in certain issues to the scholastic studies of that time.

But, less than a hundred years after him, Ibn Rushd came forward making the works of Aristotle accessible against both those of philosophers and theologians. He embarked on an incoherence of incoherence; this was accepted by the Islamic world amply. After, it was translated into Hebrew and Latin several times, and it caused ample commentaries by many a number of scholars. Ibn Rushd undertook the role of statement from the position of philosophers after five or six decades.

In Imam Ghazali’s work tahafuthul falasifah, he quotes passage after passage from Ibn Sina’s works and shows the ultimate incoherence of his philosophical arguments. Ibn Rushd quotes passage after passage in his response from Ghazali’s tahafuthul falasifah showing the incoherence of Al Ghazali’ response to that of Ibn Sina.

Despite the fact both of the books have historical importance, Imam Ghazali not only he denies certain arguments but also he appreciates for some of Ibn Sina’s remarks. Ibn Rushd openly argues that Ghazali had denied what Ibn Sina had presented as his philosophical thoughts and what philosophers added over their works. This was by his fear to be shunned like others rather were not out of conviction. Ibn tumlus, Ibn Rushd’s disciple also is of this opinion. He claims that Ibn Sina had altered the ideas of Aristotle after the theologian’s alteration of those ideas.

Ibn Rushd joins al Ghazali in the division of beings into the possible (mumkin), the impossible (muhaal) and the necessary existing (wajibul wujood) presenting these as mental concepts need not have an actual existence. And he argues that Ibn Sina had not showed his proof for the existence of god on his logical difference, the Asharite theologians opine that all is by nature possible, created out of nothing. Ibn Sina counters Aristotle without a special justification to provide the existence to the animals.

Ibn Rushd proceeds to distinguish between essence (zath) and existence (wujood). Ibn Sina had said that ‘in the necessary being essence (zath) and existence (wujood) are one’. These like objections didn’t let Ibn Rushd keeping aside from the field of Islamic philosophy. somewhat, he blames al Ghazali for claiming Ibn Sina and al Farabi that they had committed blasphemy and making accusations over them bitterly. Ibn Rushd says that this was wrong done to the very religion that he pretends to uphold.

As a zealous hunter after truth, he came to see three options open to him those are Ash’arite theology, Aristotelian philosophy and Sufi mysticism. His chief area of concern regarding Aristotelian philosophy was the imperfect principles of causality which it drawn from Aristotle which it implied about God. He adopted a form of “occasionalism, ” which is the idea that God is the real cause of every event, those things which we tend to think of “causes” being merely accidental relations. Here, Aristotle produced a kind of idea that every incident happens in front of us has the occasional relations with the causes. Here he agrees that God is the real cause and everything happens by his causation.

In al-Ghazali’s philosophy and Ibn Rushd’s scornful answer to it, Ibn Rushd, spent his early life studying the religious law of Islam (Shar’iah)... If for Medieval Christian Scholastics Aristotle was often known merely as “The Philosopher, ” Ibn Rushd’s expository and logical output on practically every aspect of Aristotle’s corpus earned him the nickname “The Commentator.” Ibn Rushd paid extremely close attention to Aristotle’s texts, and oftentimes took exception to the philosophical interpretations of them which had been given by Ibn Sina. Unlike other Muslims more concerned with the scholastic fields of the Quran than philosophy, Ibn Rushd assumed that Aristotle was nature’s model for final human perfection. He enthusiastically embraced ideas of Aristotle which other pious Muslims rejected with horror – such as the eternality of the world, the non-immortality of the human soul (ruh), and God’s ability to know finite particular things as well.

Imam Ghazali ascribes to the philosophers over the miracle (mu’jizath) of Ibrahim (A S). The learned among the philosophers do not permit disputation about the principles of religion, and he who does such a thing needs, according to them, a severe lesson. Because, whereas every science has its principles, and every student of this science must concede its principles, and may not interfere with them by denying them, this is still more obligatory in the practical science of religion, to walk on the path of the religious virtues is necessary for human being’s existence (wujood), according to them, not in so far as he is human, but in so far as he has knowledge; and therefore it is necessary for every human to grant the principles of religion and invest with authority the human who lays them down.

Ibn Rushd ascribes the side of the philosophers that none of the philosophers discuss miracles (mu’jizath) despite knowing about them, because, miracles (mu’jizath) are the foundational principles of religion, and even if a religious man eventually becomes a philosopher he may say of the religious principles only that we believe in it, it is all from our God.

It is to be emphasized here that Ibn Rushd got the idea of “double truth.” This is the idea that a thing which is true in philosophy can be false in religion, and vice versa, so that there is no harmony between philosophy and religion. This view was long credited to Ibn Rushd, and gave birth to a school in Western Christendom called “Latin Averroism, ” but there are historic indications that Ibn Rushd himself did not hold to the doctrine of “double truth”. His theory of double truth was criticized severely by Seyyed Hussein Nasr that it is a poor understanding of the hierarchical conception he did produce. It is not agreeable that ‘the Rushdian thought’ in order to the philosophical doctrines he emphasized in kashf, faslul maqal and thahafuth which express the synthesis of the doctrines of Aristotleanism and al Mohad Islam, but, it was of course the outcome of the nature of Latin Averroism as it has been criticized as improper concerning the philosophical doctrines of Ibn Rushd. [94]

Returning to his previous instance mentioned in the discussion of the causality of there being no essential causal relation between fire and the burning of a piece of cotton brought into contact with the fire, al-Ghazali gets to the root of his voluntaristic understanding of God: “If it is established that the Agent creates the burning through His will when the piece of cotton is brought in contact with the fire, He can equally well omit to create it when the contact takes place. His examples range from funny to strange to ridiculous being more effective to make his doctrines on certain philosophical concepts. Because, if someone may be ready to deny the necessary dependence of effects or their causes and relate them to the will of their Creator (swani’), and do not allow even in the will a particular definite model, but regard it as possible that it may vary and change in type, then it may happen to any of us there should be in his presence beasts of prey and flaming fires and immovable mountains and enemies equipped with arms, without his seeing them, because God had not created in him the faculty of seeing them.

And a man who had left a book at house might locate it on his comeback changed into a youth, handsome, intelligent, and efficient, or into an animal; or if he left a youth at home, he might find him turned into a dog; or he might leave ashes and find them changed into musk; or a stone changed into gold, and gold changed into stone. And if he were asked about any of these things, he would answer: “I do not know what there is at present in my house; I only know that I left a book in my house, but perhaps by now it is a horse which has soiled the library with its urine and excrement, and I left in my house a piece of bread which has perhaps changed into an apple-tree. Because, God can do any possible thing, and this is possible, and one cannot avoid being perplexed by it; and to this type of picture one may give up ad infinitum [95].

This is on the whole what Ibn Rushd had said before the denial of causes is equivalent to a denial of knowledge following Aristotle. To deny the necessity of the cause-effect relationship is to deny that any knowledge may be had of the events in the world. It leads, as al-Ghazali’s own instances show, to a ridiculous world, a world where all manner of nonsensical events could happen at any second, merely because God willed them to happen. But, says al-Ghazali, the strange world does not result from the denial of causation, because, God has created in us the knowledge that He will not do all these possible things, and we only profess that these things are not necessary, but that they are possible and may or may not happen.

Ibn Rushd’s counter-argument is that because the theologians say that the probable reverse of any actual thing is equally possible as the actual thing itself, they affirm of God that there is no fixed standard for His will either constantly or for most cases, according to which things must happen.” God would, on this account of things, be like a tyrant, “for whom nobody in his dominion can act as deputy, of whom no standard or custom is known to which reference might be made.” Like an oppressor, God’s actions would be unpredictable and, because his will would move backward and forward free of rationality, would be in principle incomprehensible.

In responding to Ghazali’s attack on philosophy, Ibn Rushd first insists that there can be no disagreement between philosophy and faith: “Truth does not contradict truth.” Although this is so in principle, Ibn Rushd goes on to make an interesting and subtle concession as he accepts that not everyone is suited to pursue religious questions in the way that philosophy demands.

Following Ghazali, Ibn Rushd distinguishes between “the people of demonstration (burhan)” and “the people of rhetoric”—that is, between the few who are able to follow philosophical reasoning, and the vast majority, who can only follow simple and superficial teachings. The masses, the people of rhetoric, ought merely to accept at face value the words of the Qur’an and the Prophet—such material was, indeed, meant for them. But this does not mean that everyone should follow such crude methods. Those who have the aptitude and the training and those who are well grounded in learning have the obligation to go much deeper. To prohibit such people from studying philosophy would be quite wrong: “those who prevent someone from thinking on the books of philosophy when he is skillful at that doing, on the grounds that some very disreputable people are supposed to have erred due to thinking upon them, are like those who prevent thirsty people from drinking cool, fresh water until they die of thirst, because some people choked on this water and died. This is what Ibn Rushd underlines as far as the philosophical education of a newcomer.”

## 4.3 CRITICISM ON ALEXANDER [96] AND IBN BAJJA

 [97]

Ibn Rushd’s writings can best be interpreted Indeed as an investigation for both an original and an authentic interpretation of Aristotle's philosophical system and it is said to have continued both through a constant dialogue with Aristotle's writings and through a parallel critical engagement with major thinkers within the Aristotelian legacy, Alexander and Ibn Bajja.

Ibn Rushd's commentary on De Anima [98] is the most significant text amid his psychological writings. In order to analyze the evolution of his thought and review the originality of his philosophical contribution, Let us now examine it in detail.

Alexander states that the material intellect (aql) is generating and corrupting, and is at the same time a faculty. This Ibn Rushd discards, just as he discarded Ibn Bajja's position, which, in his view, did not satisfactorily resolve Alexander's inconsistencies.

The analysis of Al-Mukhtasar and Al-Tabs exposes the regular processes whereby Ibn Rushd critically rejected the views of Alexander and, subsequently, those of Ibn Bajja, thereby getting rid of the Alexandrian Ibn Bajja influences in his own earlier writings. His earlier writings on logic had been deeply influenced by al -Farabi's views, even as a parallel change had occurred with respect to Abu Nasr al-Farabi, but in a later commentary on the Analytica Posteriora, (Al-Burhan) he severely criticized al -Farabi on account of views which he himself had specifically upheld earlier in Mukhtasar al-Burhan Ibn Rushd's revisionist inclinations aptly demonstrate the degree of rigour and seriousness with which he pursued his philosophical vocation; and there is no better example of this rigour than Al-sharh al-kabir, which formulates a completely different psychological system and a completely different approach to the problem of the intellect, whose force almost annuls much of what he had previously written in Al-Mukhtasar and Al-Talkhis.

The style of illustration of Al-Sharh can be said somewhat in a different way from those made of Al-Mukhtasar and Al-Talkhis, the cause being that the original Arabic text of the work is lost; the initial trustworthy version is in fact conserved in a Latin translation. Let us start in brief reviewing the central strands of this text, which largely point to the complete alteration in Ibn Rushd's idea.

The transformation exhibits not only in the new views advanced but in the very method in which Al-Sharh is written. There is an earnest effort, on Ibn Rushd's part, to clear processes of thought which had led him to face hitherto new questions and unexamined obscurities. The conclusions reached in this work are advanced in a way which absolutely suggests a new set of perspectives.

Ibn Rushd makes it clear that the material intellect (aql) constitutes the central idea of this text, but he also indicates, subsequently, that the examination of the material intellect (aql) in isolation from the other faculties won’t be practical and mistaken. As such, the scope of changes in Al-Sarh affects not only the outset of the material intellect, as previously articulated in Al-Mukhtasar and Al-Talkhis, but his entire psychological structure, concerning all the major rudiments from the intellect, theoretical intelligible (mafhoom) and the active intellect (aqli faaili) to imaginary representations. The implications of these structural changes are examined from the perspective both of epistemological states and of the different ontological states in question; his analysis of the material intellect (aql) is thus constantly linked up with all the other aspects of the intellect (aql).

Regarding the link between the material intellect (aql) and the senses (havass), Ibn Rusted states that, while the material intellect (aql) is not affected by passivity akin to that of the senses, and does not experience change analogous to what the senses experience, within it a concept of passivity exists whose meaning is subsumed within its function of acceptance. The material intellect (aql) is regarded as belonging among the type of passive faculties, and is thus rightfully distinguished from the active intellect, yet it is neither a body (jasad) nor a faculty within a body (jasad); it is, in result, a substance which accepts all forms without itself being one of the forms it accepts. This is because the material forms are not separate, whereas the material intellect (aql) is simple and separate. The material intellect (aql) is free of a specific nature, except in so far as it exists in potentia. It contains all universal material intelligible, but in actuality it is not a thing prior to its being endowed with the faculty of reason. Hence it differs from the irrational prime matter which accepts particular forms, and, similarly, differs from the form, the matter and the compound of both. It is a part of a particular mode of existence (wujood). To assert that the material intellect (aql) exists in potentia does not mean that it is not a definite thing or a substance; what is implied is that, whatever the substrate bears, it cannot exist in actuality and thus cannot be taken in an absolute sense, but should rather be approached in a qualified manner. However, the substrate need not be a definite thing in actuality; rather, what the substrate bears should not be found in it in actuality. [99]

The first problem to comprehend the nature of this intellect is the question of how it can be from the genus of the passive faculties, while at the same time being simple, separate and not mixed in with the body (jasad). If we say that it is separate and simple, does this mean that the intellect and the intelligibles (mafhoom) within it are one, as is the case with the active and separate intellects? This is a second problem.

The solution to the first problem lies in defining the concept of passivity in the context of the material intellect; for passivity, here, has a particular sense, implying a form of changeless potentiality, analogous to the disposition in the tablet to receive writing without being affected by passivity or change. Just as the tablet does not bear any writing either in actuality or in potentia approach to actuality, so the material intellect (aql) does not embrace any of the intelligible forms which it accepts, either in actuality or in potentia approaching actuality. It would be wrong to say, with Alexander, that the material intellect (aql) is akin to the disposition that exists in the tablet, rather than to the tablet itself inasmuch as it is disposed 41 This is because we must first know the nature of the thing that is disposed before we can completely know the nature of the disposition-this because the material intellect (aql) is not only a disposition. Here, clearly, Ibn Rushd is not only criticizing the views of Alexander, but also laying aside his own positions in Al-Talkis and Al-Mukasar. He emphasizes for the first tune that the capacity within the intellect is different from all other capacities, since it does not bear any intelligible (mafhoom), either in actuality or in potentia, and is neither a body (jasad) nor a faculty within a body (jasad). Nor is it a capacity existing within imaginative forms; for, among the many other absurdities enumerated, this would make it a faculty within a body (jasad) and therefore accepting the intellect itself.

As for the second problem, he asserts that the material intellect (aql) is closer to the other faculties of intellection than to separate intellects. There is, however, an important difference, namely that it is, in its essence (zath), an intellect existing in actuality, while the other intellects exist in potentia. He further states, however, that the material intellect (aql) ranks lowest among the separate intellects, in that the action of the material intellect (aql) is less commanding than that of the separate intellects. Furthermore, the material intellect (aql) is marked more by passivity than by activity, and in this respect it differs from the active intellect.

“In Al-Sharh the material intellect (aql) is not merely analyzed for the elementary purposes of formulating a new definition, but is also analyzed for its philosophical importance. Ibn Rushd daringly asserts that the material intellect (aql) is eternal and unitary with respect to mankind, and it is this which underlines the radical transformation in his thought and the revolt against his own earlier positions and those of his predecessors.” [100]

## 4.4 CRITICISM ON THE SCHOOL OF THEMISTIUS

Ibn Rushd after attacking severely the writings of Alexander and Ibn bajja, he criticizes the school of Themistius and others for their views on the theoretical intellect and the active intellect. It was mainly for Themistius’s view that the theoretical intellect springs from the combination of the active and material intellect (aql) within us, and is therefore external. Since the first two intellects are external, Ibn Rushd asserts that Themistius' standpoint has departed from that of Aristotle and is in opposition to truth itself.

It is this concept, in Ibn Rushd's vision, that will finally lead to confusions related with the process of intellection and the intellect. Ibn Rushd criticized Themistius’s position in Al-Mukhtasar, but there his criticism reflects his adoption of the Ibn Bajja or Alexandrian school. The criticism is equally determined by the ontological position of the material and active intellect. All this is in contrast to the standpoint of earlier schools, which had concluded the theoretical intellect to be eternal.

In his words, “if the material intellect (aql) is the first perfection of Man and the theoretical intellect is the second perfection, then both these categories should be functioning under the same conditions.

For example, if Man is generating and corrupting, this would apply equally to the first and second perfection within Man-a viewpoint which contradicts earlier conclusions and leads to absurdities and ambiguities concerning the material intellect. The claim, for instance that the material intellect (aql) is a body (jasad) or a faculty within a body (jasad) could not possibly be upheld, since it has already been postulated that the intellect is not generating or corrupting.” [101]

There are two separate aspects to intelligible (mafhoom): with respect to the subject which makes them dependent they are generating and corrupting, while with respect to the material intellect (aql) which makes them one of the existents of the world they are eternal; from this perspective they can be viewed as simultaneously generating, corrupting and eternal. The theoretical intellect is, in other words, eternal with respect to its activity. This solution bypasses the problems and absurdities found in the previous schools of commentators, and Ibn Rushd takes evident pride in his significant discovery, which enables him to uphold and further strengthen his central thesis about the intellect and its eternity. [102]

## 4.5 DISAGREEMENT WITH IBN SINA

[103]

It was one of the most discussed topics in the philosophical world, the wide-ranging Ibn Rushd’s critique of Ibn Sina. Ibn sina, who was a renowned figure in philosophy in the west and by whose name Islamic Neo-Platonism was identified in the Middle Ages in both East and West. As it has been discussed, it was Ibn Sina who was the direct object of al-Ghazali’s critique. While al-Ghazali tried to distance Ibn sina from the sort of Neo plationic approach to theoretical issues, Ibn Rushd was in a Gordian knot trying to counter to al-Ghazali’s attacks upon philosophy.

One of the most major methodological disputes between Ibn Rushd and Ibn Sina lies in their opposing analyses of the relationship between essence (zath) and existence (wujood), and this has an important influence upon Ibn Rushd’s approach to meaning in Islamic philosophy.

“Ibn Sina held that a state of affairs is possible only if something else acts to bring it into existence (wujood), with the sole exception of the deity. Ibn Rushd characterizes this view, quite correctly, as one in which possible states of affairs are nonexistent in themselves, until their existence (wujood) is brought about by some cause. The possible is that whose essence (zath) does not include its existence (wujood) and so must depend upon a cause which makes its actuality necessary, but only necessary relative to that cause. In this modal system there are really only two kinds of being, that necessary through another and that necessary in itself (that is, God), so that the realm of the possible becomes identical with both the actual and the necessary.” [104] Ibn Rushd accuses Ibn sina of conflating the order of thought with the order of things, the logical order with the ontological order while both of them maintain that there is a logical difference between essence (zath) and existence (wujood). Ibn sina goes on via emanation theory to show how existence (wujood) comes to essence (zath) from the necessarily acting Necessary Being. In fact, it can be considered that the theory of occasionalism of al-ghazali is like the theory of emanation of Ibn Sina. Both the doctrines interpret the dependent world as radically dependent upon something else. The account of essence (zath) and existence (wujood) provided by Ibn Sina is perfectly acceptable to al-Ghazali, with a condition that direct divine intervention is required to bring existence (wujood) to the essence (zath)s. Ibn Sina divides up the world into existing things and essence (zath)s, and into things which are necessary through another and are possible in themselves. These differences throw emphasis upon substance that is so important for Ibn Rushd and his form of Aristotelianism. This is based upon a model of the world as one entity, as a single order of nature with no impenetrable barriers to human understanding and investigation. This leads Ibn Rushd to argue that although a logical difference can be drawn between the existence (wujood) and essence (zath) of a thing, there is nonetheless a necessary relationship between existence (wujood) and essence (zath). Ibn Rushd now concludes this discussion and agrees that it is a radical error in the philosphy of language to separate essence (zath) and existence (wujood).

To understand Ibn Rushd’s account of a variety of paths to the truth, we have to grasp his theory of meaning. He emphasizes the importance of notions such as equivocation and ambiguity in language because he thinks it is important to be able to explain how names can be used in the same ways in different contexts. Ibn Rushd agrees with Aristotle that there can be no priority or posterity within the same genus, and so he develops an account of meaning which is based upon the pros hen rather than the genus-species relation. If the latter were used, meaning would come out as univocal and al-Ghazali would be entirely justified in expecting the philosophers to account for God and his activity in the same sort of language as we use to describe ourselves If meaning is expressed in terms of pros hen equivocal (bi nisba ila shay’ wahid), then we can look for some similarity in the objects which form the basis to the sharing of the name, but we do not have to insist that exactly the same name be used in its different contexts with precisely the same meaning. We can also insist that the different contexts in which a name is used have to be taken into account when we come to ask for the meaning of the name. For al-Ghazali, abstract terms have a meaning which is independent of their reference in the external world. The meaning of such terms is equivalent to the series of pictures or images in which the events they describe are characterized in particular ways. All that we have to do to conceive of God miraculously creating something out of nothing is to imagine it happening, and so it is possible.

Ibn Rushd argues that, on the contrary, it is not enough to have a chain of images in one’s mind to establish the meaningfulness of that combination of images. A meaningful use of language is possible only through the relation of linguistic terms and ideas with a framework in which they make sense, and such a framework is connected to the varying uses of the terms and to the way in which the world is.

The concept which Ibn Rushd wants his account of language to characterize is that of a point of view. In Ibn Rushd’s thought there is a continual contrast between different points of view, not just a difference between God’s point of view and the human point of view, but also a differentiation of the standpoints of the whole of humanity based upon their forms of reasoning. For example, in the Fasl al-maqal he talks about demonstrative, dialectical, rhetorical and so­phistical people, all of whom are using similar language to discuss what is important to them, namely their faith, morality, the next life and so on. This language is not identical regardless of the way in which it is used, nor is it completely equivocal. There are relations between different applications of the same name, and these relations are strong enough for it to make sense to say that these uses are of the same name; so there being a variety of routes to the same destination, a variety of views based upon the same ideas and beliefs, and a variety of ways of living which together add up to a morally and religiously desirable form of life.

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

## 5.1 SUMMARY OF THE STUDY

The focus of this study has been the general contradictions in the philosophical doctrines of Ibn Rushd to that of Islamic principles. The study questioned one of the fundamental principles of the peripatetic philosophy which is quite unsettled in front of the Islamic theological principles. This context can be considered as the decline of the philosophical doctrines he put forward.

This study’s hypothesis was that the certain theological and philosophical doctrines of Ibn Rushd and his incoherence in theologians’ arguments. To evaluate this hypothesis, the study has been examining the inconsistency of the works and the peculiarity of the Islamic principles. As far as the philosophical issues are concerned in the political, ethical, metaphysical, and psychological importance, his doctrines are said to be unauthentic and contradictory to that of the Islamic theological and philosophical principles.

The study designs a methodology for collecting, analyzing and identifying the most contradictory issues and the crude solutions for those through the mechanism of Islamic theology and philosophy to this case. The method involves both an analytic and criticizing approaches. The empirical part of the study involves the peripheral reading of the issues related with these issues such as the stand point of Ibn Sina, Ibn Bajja, and some other scholars concerning certain issues. As a result, this study examines the method of the criticism of philosophers over the Islamic doctrines and their mistaken studies as well.

The results of the study demonstrate that the Islamic doctrines in certain subjects could positively inherit the coherent theological pursuits. It has been also demonstrated that the consequences of the arguments of the theologians and philosophers resulted not in the victory of none rather it offered theological confusions in a great deal. It is set up in an easy order to be understood and to be referred to further researches for who is keen interested to do. Every chapter has shown the relevant interference in every issue in accordance with a special structure of presentation.

## 5.2 POSSIBILITIES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

In case of the scarcity of references on the relevance of Islamic principles over the philosophical doctrines, this study recommends for further research on this topic touching every nooks and corners of the related topics as well. And it can’t be ensured that this study is complete in this manner and it may be found too many flimsy viewpoints which carry ambiguous nature and can’t find out the truth as well. So, in every respect, this study should be continued in case of the meticulous nature of Islamic principles and bringing out the distorted countenance of the philosophical concepts of Ibn Rushd.

This study mainly recommends the look over of the possibilities for further research in these areas:

1. A well defined analysis of the philosophical doctrines of these like philosophers whose doctrines make the challenges on the Islamic principles of theology.

2. A characteristic research of the arguments of the philosophers with special reference to their works.

3. The new method of this study with the earnest exertion of the graduates in Islamic philosophy and theology.

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25. www.wikipedia.org, Ibn Rushd, al Ghazali, ibn sina, philsophy
26. www.muslimphilosophy.com/Ibn Rushd

### APPENDIX A: CHRONOLOGICAL EVENTS OF HIS TIME

1126 Ibn Rushd born in Córdoba; Adelard of Bath translates Al-Khwarizmi’s ninth-century Astronomical Tables.

1137 Geoffrey of Monmouth writes History of the Kings of Britain, a source for King Arthur, Merlin, Lear, Cymbeline, etc.

1140 St. Gotthard Pass opens as a commercial route through the Alps.

1141 Peter of Toledo translates al-Kindi’s Risalah, an account of Islam.

1143 Robert of Chester and Hermann the Dalmatian translate the Qur’an into Latin.

1144 Robert of Chester translates Jabir ibn Hayyan’s ninth-century work on alchemy; the following year he translates al-Khwarizmi’s Algebra, written in 850.

1145 Construction of Friday Mosque in Isfahan begins.

1146 St. Bernard proclaims the Second Crusade.

1148 Almohads enter al-Andalus; Second Crusade ends.

1150 Construction of cathedrals in Angers, Le Mans, Lisbon, Pécs and Stavanger begins.

1153 Ibn Rushd travels to Marrakech and begins work on astronomy.

1154 Al-Idrisi’s planisphere and Roger’s Book, written for Roger II of Sicily, completed.

1157 Munich founded; University of Bologna founded.

1162 Ibn Rushd completes Compendium of Medical Knowledge (Kitab al-Kulliyat fil-Tibb).

1168 Toltec Empire destroyed by Aztecs and others.

1169 Ibn Rushd appointed qadi in Seville.

1170–1175 Ibn Rushdwrites major works on Aristotle.

1172 Construction of Great Mosque begins in Seville.

1173–1174 Saladin conquers Damascus.

1178 Ibn Rushd in Marrakech writes On the Nature of the Universe.

1179 Hildegarde of Bingen completes Physica.

1180 Ibn Rushd appointed qadi in Córdoba.

1184 Ibn Rushd completes Incoherence of the Incoherent Philosophy of al-Ghazali; construction of Giralda begins in Seville.

1187 Saladin conquers Jerusalem; death of Gerard of Cremona, who with others translated more than 70 Greek and Arabic scientific works into Latin.

1189 Third Crusade proclaimed.

1190 Ibn Rushd completes his commentaries on Aristotle’s Metaphysics and On the Soul.

1191 Ibn Rushd finishes Commentary on Plato’s Republic.

1193 Richard the Lionhearted defeats Saladin.

1195–1197 Almohad authorities banish Ibn Rushd, burn his books.

1198 Ibn Rushd dies in Marrakech.

(Source: Doctor, philosopher, and Renaissance man; Caroline Stone; Saudi Aramco World)

### APPENDIX B: THE TWENTY DISCUSSIONS IN TAHAFUTHU TAHAFUTH (THE INCOHERENCE OF INCOHERENCE)

The first analysis: Regarding the Eternity of the World

The second analysis: The Denial of their Theory of the Incorruptibility of the World and of Time and Motion

The third analysis: The demonstration of their confusion in saying that God is the agent and the maker of the world and that the world in His product and act, and the demonstration that these expressions are in their system only metaphors without any real sense.

The fourth analysis: Screening that they are unable to prove the existence (wujood) of a Creator (swani’) of the world.

The fifth analysis: To show their inability to prove God’s unity and the impracticality of two necessary existents both without a cause

The sixth analysis: To counter their denial of Allah’s attributes

The seventh analysis: To counter their claim that nothing can share with the First its genus and be differentiated from it through a specific difference and that with respect to its intellect the division into genus and specific difference cannot be applied to it

The eighth analysis: To counter their theory that the existence (wujood) of the First is simple, namely that it is pure existence (wujood) and that its existence (wujood) stands in relation to no quiddity and to no essence (zath), but stands to necessary existence (wujood) as do other beings to their quiddity (mahiyath)

The ninth analysis: To counter their proof that the First is incorporeal

The tenth analysis: To prove their inability to demonstrate that the world has a Creator (swani’) and a cause, and that in fact they are forced to admit atheism

The eleventh analysis: To show the inability of those philosophers who believe that the First knows other things besides its own self and that it knows the genera and the species in a universal way, to prove that this is so.

The twelfth analysis: About the weakness of the philosophers to prove that Cod knows him.

The thirteenth analysis: To counter those who support that God is ignorant of the individual things which are divided in time into present, past, and future

The fourteenth analysis: To counter their proof that heaven is an animal mowing in a circle in obedience to God.

The fifteenth analysis: To counter the theory of the philosophers about the aim which moves heaven

The sixteenth analysis: To counter the philosophical theory that the souls of the heavens observe all the particular events of this world

About the natural sciences:

The first analysis: The denial of a logical necessity between cause and effect

The second analysis: The inability of the philosophers to show by demonstrative proof that the soul is a spiritual substance.

The third analysis: Denial of the philosophers’ proof for the immortality of the soul.

The fourth analysis: Regarding the philosophers’ denial of bodily resurrection

(Source: The incoherence of incoherence trans. and Ed. By S. Van Den Bergh)

Notes

[1] Leo strauss (1899 –1973) is a German-American political philosopher.

[2] Saad dhin thafthazani is an Islamic theologian, Muslim Persian polymath and his full name is Sa'ad al-Din Masud ibn Umar ibn Abd Allah al-Taftazani also known as Al-Taftazani and Taftazani (1322 [3] - 1390 [4]).

[3] Imam al Ghazali: Abū Ḥāmed Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad al-Ghazālī (c. 1058 – 1111), known as Al-Ghazali or Algazel to the Western medieval world, a Muslim theologian, jurist, philosopher, and mystic of Persian descent.

[4] Al andalus is ‘Andalusia’ is said to muslim spain and considered those parts under muslims from the Iberian penisula, started by muslim occupation in 711-and came to an end in the time of the fall of Granada in 1492 Hij.

[5] Said al andalusi (1029–1070) was an Andalusi Muslim Qadi. He was born at Almería and died at Toledo. Said Al-Andalusi was a historian, philosopher of science and thought, and mathematical scientist with a special interest in astronomy.

[6] Said al andalusi, tabaqat al umam p.63 quoted from Islamic philosophy, theology and mysticism by majid fakhri

[7] Maslamah ibn Majiriti: Maslama al-Majriti or Abu al-Qasim al-Qurtubi al-Majriti, d. 1008 or 1007 CE) is a Muslim astronomer, chemist, mathematician, economist and Scholar in Islamic Spain.

[8] Ibn Masarrah, Abu 'Abd Allah Muhammad (883–931),

[9] The oxford islamic encyclopedia p. 371

[10] Islamic philosophy, theology and mysticism by Majid Fakhri p.91

[11] Malikite law (madhhab) is one of the schools of Fiqh or religious law within Sunni Islam.

[12] History of islamic philosophy ed by seyed husein nasr p.338

[13] The oxford islamic encyclopedia p. 368

[14] Ibn thufyl is Abu Bakr Muhammad ibn Abd al-Malik ibn Muhammad ibn Tufail al-Qaisi al-Andalusi; and an Andalusian Muslim polymath, a writer, novelist, Islamic philosopher, Islamic theologian, physician, vizier, and court official.

[15] The Hundred Great Muslims by K.Jamil.Ahmed p.98

[16] Saudi Aramco World, Article By Caroline Stone

[17] Ptolemy: Claudius Ptolemy is a Greek-Roman citizen of Egypt who wrote in Greek.

[18] The Hundred Great Muslims by K.Jamil.Ahmed p.99

[19] Albert magnus: Albertus Magnus, O.P.(1193-1280), also known as Albert the Great, is a Catholic saint and a German Dominican friar and a bishop as well.

[20] Bonaventure: Saint Bonaventure, O.F.M., born Giovanni di Fidanza, is an Italian medieval scholastic theologian and philosopher.

[21] Thomas aquinas: Saint Thomas Aquinas is an Italian Dominican priest, and an immensely influential philosopher and theologian in the tradition of scholasticism.

[22] Mohammed Abduh, was an Egyptian Islamic jurist, religious scholar and liberal reformer, regarded as the founder of Islamic Modernism but regarded in other hand as an unfading one according to sunni muslims.

[23] Muhammed Abduh: Biography; By Charles C. Adams

[24] Taifa means an independent Muslim-ruled principality, usually an emirate or petty kingdom

[25] For further details see Appendix A The chronological events of his time.

[26] Yahya suhrawardi is known as sheikh ul ishraq (master of illumination) and suhrawardi al maqtool (one who was killed) and the founder of illuminationist school of Islamic philosophy.

[27] Ibn arabi is an Arab Andalusian Sufi mystic and philosopher. He is also known for his explanation of Tawhid through the concept of Wahdat ul Wujood

[28] A history of god by karan amstrong p.228

[29] Formative period of Islamic thought by William Montgomery watt, 2006, p.204

[30] Science and civilization in Islam by seyyed Hussein nasr p.315

[31] Ibn Rushd: bidayathu qarnin wa nihayathu qarnin p.15

[32] Al munqidh min al dhalal: One of the most famous works of al-Ghazali and it is considered to be an autobiography.

[33] The Hundred Great Muslims by K.Jamil.Ahmed

[35] For further details on the twenty discussions see Appendix B

[36] The history of Islamic philosophy Ed. By seyyed Hussein Nasr

[37] (Kashful Manahijl adillah) An Exposition of the Methods of Argument concerning the Doctrines of Religion, the future life by Ibn Rushd p. 251

[38] Dirasathun fil falsafah

[39] Holy quran 59:2

[40] Holy quran 17:184

[41] The history of Islamic philosophy Ed. By seyyed Hussein Nasr p. 339

[42] The history of Islamic philosophy Ed. By seyyed Hussein Nasr

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[44] Islamic rationalism: A critical evaluation of Harun nasution`s thought by Muhammed shuhaimi ishaq, 2009.

[45] The history of islamic philosophy by m.m sheriff p.547

[46] The history of islamic philosophy by M.M sheriff p.545

[47] Ibid p.545

[48] Science and civilization in Islam by Seyyed Hussein Nasr

[49] Utopia is an imaginary idea presented by Thomas more which is referred to a community or society possessing highly desirable or perfect qualities. The term has been used to describe both intentional communities that attempt to create an ideal society, and fictional societies portrayed in literature.

[50] On The Harmony of Religions and Philosophy transl.by Mohammed Jamil-al-Rahman

[51] Mutakallimun is one who followed kalam, an Islamic speculative theology

[52] Soofasthayiyah: In ancient Greece, sophists (Soofasthayiyah) were a category of teachers who specialized in using the tools of philosophy and rhetoric for the purpose of teaching excellence, or virtue predominantly to young statesmen and nobility.

[53] IBN RUSHD: chapter 18, www.muslimphilosophy.com

[54] IBN RUSHD: chapter 18, www.muslimphilosophy.com

[55] Ibid

[56] A Commentary on the Creed of Islam, Sharhul aqayid ul nnasafiyyah trns. by Earl Edgar Elder p.

[57] Causality is the relationship between a set of factors (causes) and a phenomenon (the effect).

[58] M.M sheriff is Director of the Institute of Islamic Culture, Lahore Pakistan and author of the history of Muslim philosophy

[59] The history of islamic philosophy by M M sharif p.551

[60] The incoherence of incoherence by Ibn Rushd p.255 trans. by Simon Van Den Bergh

[61] The incoherence of philosophers: p. 185

[62] A Commentary on the Creed of Islam, Sharhul aqayid ul nnasafiyyah trns. by Earl Edgar Elder p.185

[63] ibid p. 190

[64] ibid p.36

[65] Ibid p.46

[66] Karan Amstrong (born 14 November 1944) is a British author and commentator known for her books on comparative religion.

[67] Holy Quran: 42:9

[68] A history of God by Karan Amstrong; p 230

[69] Ibn Rushd, Article published in www.muslimphilosophy.com

[70] Commentary on the creed of islam by Earl Edger Eldar trans. of sharhul aqayid ul nnasafiyyah

[71] Fatalism is a philosophical doctrine emphasizing the subjugation of all events or actions to fate.

[72] Holy quran 41:12

[73] Abul hasanil ashari (873-935) is the founder of Asharism, the most prominent school in Sunni theology (kalam).

[74] Holy quran 76:1-3

[75] Mutazilites are the followers of the major theological school of Islam who held reason (aql) above scripture (shar’). It is said to be emerged in the middle of eighth century and lasted till the twelfth century.

[76] Qadarites are a group who defended free will against the doctrine of predestination.

[77] Khajirites (the secessionists) initially they followed Ali and later they seceded from Ali. They viewed the caliph as a virtuous authority of Islam.

[78] Murjites are the followers of murjia’h, it was developed by Jahm ibn safvan and Abu Hanifah as a corrective to extreme kharijites.

[79] Asharites are followers of Asharism, the prominent school of sunni theology (kalam).

[80] Bergsonian means the philosophy of Henri Bergson (1859-1941), which asserts that the flow of time personally experienced is free and unrestricted rather than measured on a clock and contends that all living forms arise from a persisting natural force.

[81] Commentary on the creed of islam trans. by earl Edger Elder P.60

[82] Neo platonic the ideas belong to Neoplatonism which is the modern term for a school of mystical philosophy that took shape in the 3rd century, based on the teachings of Plato and earlier Platonists.

[83] Al maturidi (861-944) is the father of the school of the Maturidiyah which became the largest and the most intellectually active Hanafi legal school.

[84] Maimonides is a preeminent medieval Jewish philosopher and one of the most prolific and followed Torah scholars and physicians of the Middle Ages.

[85] Epicurus is an ancient Greek philosopher as well as the founder of the school of philosophy called Epicureanism.

[86] Atomists are one who believed in atomism which is a natural philosophy that developed in several ancient traditions

[87] Al baqillani: Abu Bakr Muḥammad ibn al-Ṭayyib al-Bāqillānī (950-1013) is an Ashari Islamic scholar and Maliki lawyer, influential in popularising Sunni Asharism.

[88] Commentary on the creed of Islam trans. by earl Edger Elder

[89] Muhammed iqbal, immortality of the human soul p.

[90] The incoherence of the philosophers p.221

[91] The History of Philosophy in Islam By Dr. T. J. De Boer Translated By Edward R. Jones, B.D.

[92] The incoherence of incoherence by Ibn Rushd trans.and notes by Simon Van Den Bergh p.20

[93] Ex nihilio is a Latin phrase meaning "out of nothing".

[94] Ibn Rushd, Dominiq Urvoy, The history of Islamic philosophy ed by Seyyed Hussein Nasr p.330

[95] ad infinitum is a Latin phrase meaning "to infinity" or "forevermore".

[96] Alexander of Aphrodisias was a Peripatetic philosopher and the most celebrated of the Ancient Greek commentators on the writings of Aristotle.

[97] Ibn bajja is known as Avempace in European works.

[98] De anima means ‘On the Soul’ is a major treatise by Aristotle.

[99] History of islamic philosophy, ed by Seyyed Hussein Nasr p.338

[100] Ibn Rushd chapter 12, www.muslimphilosophy.com

[101] Ibid

[102] www.muslimphilsophy.com/ibnrushd

[103] Ibn sina (980-1037) is known as Avicenna in the west

[104] Ibn sina and Ibn Rushd, www.muslimphilosophy.com

[www.alhassanain.org/english](http://www.alhassanain.org/english)